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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays related to my research on environmental
policy, emissions leakage, and public policy. In the first essay, I address how open
economies respond to environmental policy instruments under uncertainty. I develop
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model for a small open economy (SOE)
and evaluate the macroeconomic fluctuations in response to cap-and-trade, pollution
tax, and emissions intensity standard under two shocks: productivity and terms
of trade. My findings suggest that cap-and-trade policies are most effective in
dampening macroeconomic volatility from productivity shock. However, under the
terms of trade shock, pollution tax, and intensity target policies are as effective as
the cap-and-trade policies in reducing the macroeconomic volatility of consumption
and employment. The second essay addresses the effects of a general fall in service
trade costs on emissions leakage. I develop a two-good (manufacturing and services)
general equilibrium model of a SOE to evaluate emissions leakage from an emissions
tax increase. Under free trade in manufacturing and no trade in services, no leakage
occurs. Allowing for trade in services, a positive leakage is driven by income, output,
and terms-of-trade effects. Calibrating the model to the Canadian macroeconomic
data, I find that the emissions leakage is about 18 % lower when using trade friction
levels estimated from the literature rather than assuming no trade frictions in services.
In the third essay, using a data panel for American states from 1987 to 2010, I evaluate
the effects of rainy day funds (RDFs) on state gross domestic product (GDP). RDFs
are intended to smooth taxes and spending to alleviate fiscal stress during recessions.
v
While RDFs are not intended to affect the business cycle, they may do so through fund
accumulation during periods of economic expansion and through fund disbursement
during periods of economic contraction. Using an Arellano-Bond estimator, I find that
the RDFs average output multiplier is about l.5. The multiplier during recessionary
periods is about 3.4 and during election years is as big as in recessionary periods.
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Chapter 1
Environmental Policy Instruments
Under Terms of Trade and
Business Cycle Uncertainties
1.1 Introduction
How do environmental policy instruments respond to trade shocks? Emerging studies
show that the surge of low-cost exports from China has led to downward pressure on
the price of traded goods (Kamin et al., 2006; Amiti and Freund, 2010; Mandel,
2013). China’s entry into the world economy has led to a big movement in the
terms of trade and an increase in imports in much of the rest of the world. We ask
how such fluctuations in the terms of trade affect the choice of environmental policy
instruments. The existing literature that evaluates environmental policy instruments’
merits under uncertainty employs a closed-economy framework. This limits their
ability to address this question.
In this study, we analyze the properties of environmental policy instruments
under uncertainties for an economy open to international trade and capital flows.
We document the economic responses to environmental regulation under uncertain
1
economic growth and unanticipated import surges. To do so, we develop a small
open economy (SOE) dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that
incorporates three environmental policy instruments which are certainty equivalent
in emissions: cap-and-trade, pollution tax, and an emission intensity standard,
which sets an allowed emissions level per unit of output. We introduce exogenous
temporary productivity shocks to simulate uncertain economic growth and an
exogenous temporary terms-of-trade shock to simulate an unanticipated import surge.
We then compare the effects on key macroeconomic variables -welfare, pollution levels,
outputs, consumption, investment, supply of labor and trade flows -in the economy
across cap-and-trade, pollution tax, and emissions intensity standard policies.
Since Weitzman (1974) seminal article, economists have been weighing the merits
of different environmental policy instruments. More recently, environmental policy’s
ability to respond to the business cycle has been an important metric in evaluating
the policy instrument choice. Pizer (2005), Webster et al. (2010) and Ellerman and
Wing (2003) compare policies indexing emissions’ levels to output (known as intensity
targets) to pollution taxes, and to cap-and-trade policies.1 Fischer and Springborn
(2011) and Angelopoulos et al. (2013) are among the few researchers who compared
the performance of emission caps, emission taxes, and indexed standards under real
business cycles. Annicchiarico and Dio (2015) compares the performance of these
policy instruments under nominal shocks.
The literature mainly adopts a closed-economy framework to address these
concerns. In a world with near perfect capital mobility and large international trade
flows, the domestic economy is no longer fully constrained by its resources. With
increased globalization the ability of environmental policy instruments to respond to
international shocks is increasingly important. Our results suggest that cap-and-trade
policies reduce the business cycle’s intensity relative to a pollution tax or intensity
target, but the cap-and-trade is most effective under a total factor productivity
shock. This result is consistent with the findings of Fischer and Springborn (2011);
1See Peterson (2008) and Hepburn (2006) for reviews of this literature.
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Annicchiarico and Dio (2015) in closed economy models. However, for a terms-of-
trade shock, we all three policy instruments have a similar impact on key economic
variables like consumption and employment. The cap-and-trade policy is most
effective in reducing the impact of a terms-of-trade fluctuation on trade flows, but
intensity targets have the lowest welfare costs.
There is a long history of literature evaluating the environmental policy’s instru-
ment choices that regulators face. Several studies have considered environmental
policy instruments in the presence of uncertainty in terms of both benefit and cost
when they are correlated (Quirion, 2010; Shrestha, 2001; Stavins, 1996). Antoniou
et al. (2012); Heuson (2010) and Quirion (2005) have considered the effect of the
choice of environmental policies on both uncertain economic growth and uncertain
abatement costs. Antoniou et al. (2012) considers the instruments under international
duopoly in a static model, while Heuson (2010) considers the choice under uncertainty
in market power and abatement costs. Quirion (2005) considers the choice of
environmental instruments under both uncertain economic growth and abatement
cost under autarky. This literature has focused on either economies under autarky
or has used a static modeling framework with a focus on strategic interaction among
agents; thus, the literature ignores an additional channel of international trade and
capital flows that may smooth business cycles’ intensity.
There is considerable evidence that environmental regulation can affect inter-
national trade flows. For example, Copeland (1994) and Copeland and Taylor
(2003a) recognize the interaction between international trade and pollution in a
small open economy. Ederington et al. (2005) shows that environmental regulations
have a significant impact on trade flows between developed and developing nations,
particularly in more mobile industries. McAusland (2008) analyzes environmental
regulation’s impact on international trade flows while comparing pollution associated
with production and consumption. This literature relies on static models and
assumes a constant marginal utility of consumption. We relax those assumptions
to incorporate environmental regulation’s intertemporal effects under uncertainty.
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The intertemporal effects are important in consumers’ investment decisions under
uncertainty because regulations like cap-and-trade fix the amount of emissions while
inducing uncertain outcomes in the abatement cost. An emissions tax fixes the
abatement cost while inducing uncertain outcomes in emissions. These effects are
even more important in economies open to international trade and capital because of
the additional investment channel. We contribute to this literature by showing that
the choice of environmental policy instrument affects the levels of international trade
and investment flows.
Most similar to our study are four recent papers examining the robustness of
different environmental policy instruments to business cycle shocks. Heutel (2012)
evaluates the optimal evolution of dynamic environmental regulation across the
business cycle and finds that the optimal carbon taxes and cap-and-trade policies to be
pro-cyclical. We employ a static exogenous environmental regulation to evaluate how
economies respond to the exogenous environmental regulation rather than evaluating
the path for optimal policy that policy makers may not implement during business-
cycle peaks and troughs. Fischer and Springborn (2011) evaluates carbon taxes,
emissions caps, and emissions intensity standards across the business cycle. The
results suggest that emissions caps reduce productivity shocks’ intensity relative
to an emissions tax while the emissions tax is more volatile. Also, they find that
an emission intensity standard has lower volatility than business as usual and is
also welfare enhancing. They do not find any significant difference in welfare cost
across the emissions cap and carbon tax policies. We expand on this approach by
incorporating a labor-leisure choice in a small open-economy model. Most recently,
Annicchiarico and Dio (2015) compares a cap-and-trade policy with an emissions
tax and an intensity target in a New Keynesian model and shows that cap-and-
trade policies dampen the macroeconomic dynamics but that the degree of price
rigidity matters in terms of welfare. In a review article, Fischer and Heutel (2013)
describes the emerging literature employing real business-cycle models to evaluate
environmental policy. These models, however, do not include international trade or
4
capital flows and, therefore, cannot consider the impact of a terms-of-trade shock. We
extend these results by comparing exogenous environmental policy instruments across
the business cycles for economies open to international trade and capital mobility.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 outlines the
model and functional forms. Section 1.3 solves the model in the steady state and
evaluates the policies in the absence of uncertainty. Section 1.4 presents the model’s
numerical analysis and evaluates environmental policy instruments in the face of
increased productivity and adverse terms of trade. Section 1.5 evaluates welfare costs
across the environmental policy instruments under the uncertainties. Section 1.6
concludes this chapter.
1.2 The Model
We consider an economy that has a continuum of households with identical
preferences. The infinitely lived households consume domestically produced and
imported goods and enjoy leisure activities to maximize expected life-time utility.
Households supply labor and capital to firms, which produce goods using two factor
inputs: labor and capital. Pollution is generated during the production of goods, and
in our model pollution is treated as an input. Pollution is assumed to be generated in
proportion to fossil-fuel use in the production process. Alternatively, a fixed amount
of pollution per unit of fossil fuel is implicit in our model.
The economy under consideration is open to free trade and capital is allowed
to flow internationally; however, labor is immobile. The domestic government’s
role is limited to implementing an environmental policy and redistributing revenues,
if any, to households in a lump-sum. Therefore, in this economy, outputs are
either domestically consumed, invested, or exported. If domestic absorption exceeds
production, the economy imports from the rest of the world, meaning that households
can satisfy both their consumption and investment needs by raising foreign debt. This
5
point is the key point of departure from models in the literature.2 Further, we assume
that our economy is small compared to the rest of the world’s, meaning the domestic
environmental policy change will not affect capital’s international interest rate and
is exogenous to this economy. The firms are price takers, and they make export and
import decisions given the world’s fixed prices.
We solve the problems of households and firms by assuming a representative
household and firm.
Households’ problem
With capital mobility, households can borrow internationally but face an upward-
sloping supply schedule of borrowing because of a country-specific risk premium
that increases with the level of debt. We endogenize the interest rate using the risk
premium, another key distinction from the literature. In closed economy models, the
rate of return from domestic investments determines the real interest rate (See Fischer
and Springborn (2011) and Angelopoulos et al. (2013)). For a small open economy,
the international capital market exogenously determines such an interest rate.3 To
resolve this problem, we use a debt-elastic interest-rate premium widely employed in
the international economics literature (see Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003); Mendoza
and Uribe (2000); Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2001)). Under the debt-elastic interest
rate, the domestic interest rate is a function of an exogenous international interest
rate and a premium
Rt = R
∗ + P (expD˜t−D − 1) (1.1)
2See Fischer and Springborn (2011); Angelopoulos et al. (2013) and Annicchiarico and Dio (2015).
Note that these studies assume a closed economy and require that domestic absorption be equal to
domestic production each period.
3This implicitly makes the model’s steady state dependent on initial conditions. In other words,
the temporary shocks have long-run effects on an open economy’s state, creating a random walk
component in such models’ dynamic equilibrium.
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where R∗ is the exogenous interest rate in international capital markets, P (.) is the
economy’s risk premium, D˜t is the economy’s aggregate debt, and D is the steady-
state debt level. Borrowing costs increase with the stock of debt issued (P ′ > 0). In
a representative economy, D˜t = Dt, a representative household’s debt level.
The representative household maximizes her expected lifetime utility in present
value
max
Ct,Ht
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt U(Ct, Ht) (1.2)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the fixed subjective discount factor, Ct is consumption, and
Ht represents the amount of labor the household supplies. We assume that the
representative household is endowed with one unit of time, and we abstract from
population growth. Thus, 1−Ht represents leisure activities. The utility’s functional
form satisfies: UC > 0, UH < 0, UCC < 0, UHH < 0 and UCH > 0.
The household is subject to the following budget constraints:
Dt = (1 +Rt−1)Dt−1 + ptCt + It + Φ(Kt −Kt−1)− wtHt − rtKt−1 −Gt − Πt (1.3)
where Dt is the household’s stock of foreign debt, pt is the relative price of
consumption, Kt is the stock of capital, It is investment, Φ(.) is investment-related
adjustment cost (with Φ(0) = 0, Φ′(0) = 0), wt is the wage-per-unit of labor supplied
to firms, rt is the rental rate per unit of capital supplied to firm, Gt is a lump-
sum transfer from government(if any), and Πt represents a dividend from firms. We
consider the debt to be denominated in terms of the world’s export price of outputs.
In our model, all prices are relative to the world’s price of outputs.
Capital stock evolves as
Kt = It + (1− δ)Kt−1 (1.4)
where δ is the depreciation rate.
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The representative household chooses processes [Ct, Ht, Kt, Dt]
∞
t=0 to maximize
her life-time expected utility Eq.(2.1) subject to the budget constraint Eq.(1.3), a
no-ponzi constraint, lim
j→∞
Et
(
Dt+j∏j
s=1(1 +Rs)
)
≤ 0 and initial stocks of capital and
a debt. With λ1t being the Lagrangian multiplier for the budget constraint, the
representative household’s maximization problem can be represented by the following
Lagrangian:
max
Ct,Ht,Kt,Dt
L =Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
U(Ct, Ht) + λ1t
{
Dt − (1 +Rt−1)Dt−1 − ptCt −Kt
+ (1− δ)Kt−1 − Φ(Kt −Kt−1) + wtHt + rtKt−1 +Gt + Πt
}] (1.5)
The first order conditions are:
Ct : UCt(Ct, Ht) = λ1tpt (1.6)
Ht : −UHt(Ct, Ht) = λ1twt (1.7)
Kt : λ1t
[
1 + Φ′(Kt −Kt−1)
]
= β Et
[
λ1t+1
{
(1− δ + rt+1 + Φ′(Kt+1 −Kt)
}]
(1.8)
Dt : λ1t = β Et λ1t+1 (1 +Rt) (1.9)
These are standard Euler equations. Eq. (1.6) shows that households’ optimal
consumption level occurs when marginal utility from consumption is equal to the
marginal utility from wealth. In Eq. (1.7), we see that households optimally supply
labor when marginal utility from leisure is equal to the wage per unit of labor supplied.
Eq. (1.8) shows that households optimally invest one unit of capital when marginal
cost of the investment (in terms of utils) is equal to the expected present value of
marginal benefit of the investment next period. The investment’s marginal cost is
shown in the LHS of Eq. (1.8), and the expected present value of marginal benefit
of the investment next period is shown in the equation’s RHS. Likewise, Eq. (1.9)
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shows the cost and benefit of borrowing a unit of debt. The LHS of Eq. (1.9) is the
utility the agent receives from one unit of borrowing while the RHS is the expected
present value of the debt’s repayment cost(in utils).
Firms’ problem
We model the representative firm’s problem as follows; The representative firm
maximizes profit
max
Kt,Mt,Ht
Et
∞∑
t=0
βtΠt = Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
Yt(At, Kt−1,Mt, Ht)−wtHt−rtKt−1−qtMt
]
(1.10)
where Yt = AtK
α1
t−1M
α2
t H
1−α1−α2
t , At is the total factor productivity (exogenous), Mt
is the fossil fuel level (or pollution level proportional to the fossil fuel level), and qt
is the price of fossil fuel.4 Note that qt also represents per-unit emission tax since
Mt represents pollution level. The capital share in output is α1, and the fossil-fuel
expenditure’s share in output is α2; thus, 1−α1−α2 is the share of labor in production.
The factor shares, α1 and α2, are bounded by (0, 1). We assume that the economy has
an abundant supply of fossil fuels and that the fossil fuel expenditure qtMt remains
within the economy as qtMt is treated as the emissions tax revenue transferred to the
households in a lump sum.5 Note that output is the numeraire good; thus, the prices
are relative to the output’s export price.
In the absence of environmental regulation (i.e., under business as usual), Eq.
(1.10) represents the firms’ problem. Following Fischer and Springborn (2011), we
abstract pollution from the households’ welfare function since we intend to capture
only the environmental regulation’s welfare cost. This welfare cost is measured
through the reduced consumption of households keeping fixed labor, which is a
standard procedure in the DSGE framework. To address the externalities associated
4Fischer and Springborn (2011) also used a similar Cobb-Douglas form of production.
5In the model, firms perfectly comply with environmental regulations. Since fossil fuel
expenditure is observable and is accurately measured, the treatment of fossil fuel expenditure is
justifiable.
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with pollution emissions, we assume the government imposes an environmental
policy CAP (Yt), which could be a cap-and-trade, an emissions tax, or an emission
intensity target. These policies are cost-less to administer, and firms comply with
the environmental policies. Cap-and-trade firms are required to possess a permit
to emit a unit of pollution in each period and pay a permit price (the constraint’s
shadow value in the case of cap-and-trade). In this case, CAPt = Mt, which is
exogenously fixed. Under an emissions-tax policy, firms are required to pay a tax
for each unit of emissions generated. In the case of an emission intensity target, the
policy exogenously fixes a ratio of Mt to Yt. Note that these policies are exogenously
chosen to reduce emissions and could be sub-optimal.6
We assume that the environmental policy is binding on firms
CAP (Yt) = Mt (1.11)
and the Lagrangian of the representative firm’s problem is
max
Ht,Kt,Mt
L = Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
Yt(At, Kt−1,Mt, Ht)−wtHt − rtKt−1 − qtMt
+ λ2t
(
CAP (Yt)−Mt
)] (1.12)
where λ2t is the policy constraint’s shadow price.
The first order conditions are
Ht : YHt(At, Kt−1,Mt, Ht)(1 + λ2tCapYt) = wt (1.13)
Kt : YKt(At+1, Kt,Mt+1, Ht+1)(1 + λ2t+1CapYt+1) = rt+1 (1.14)
Mt : YMt(At, Kt−1,Mt, Ht)(1 + λ2tCapYt) = qt + λ2t (1.15)
6Heutel (2012) assumes efficient environmental policy and analyzes how that optimal policy
should evolve across the business cycle. We focus on static policies, which are certainty equivalent
in emission reductions, and compare the responses of static policies across the real business cycle
and terms-of-trade shocks.
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These are standard Euler equations for the firm’s problem. Firms choose factor
inputs: labor (Eq. (1.13)), capital (Eq. (1.14)), and fossil fuels (Eq.(2.9)) based on
their marginal factor returns.
Our economy responds to two exogenous shocks: home productivity and terms
of trade. The economy may face a sudden improvement in technology, leading to a
boom in the economy. We model such economic growth through a temporary positive
shock to the total factor productivity. On the other hand, the economy may face a
deterioration in terms of trade because of import competition from sudden surge-of-
trade flows from countries like China. We model such terms of trade shock through
an exogenous positive temporary shock to consumption’s relative price. These two
shocks follow stationary autoregressive processes as below:
logAt = ρA logAt−1 + At (1.16)
log pt = ρp log pt−1 + pt (1.17)
where, ρA and ρp are persistency of the shocks and are bounded by 0 and 1. The
parameters At and pt are serially uncorrelated shocks normally distributed with
mean zero and standard deviations σA and σp, respectively.
The following market-clearing conditions are satisfied. The representative firm’s
zero profit condition is
Yt(At, Kt−1,Mt, Ht) = wtHt + rtKt−1 + qtMt (1.18)
and the resource constraint in an open economy is
Dt = (1 +Rt−1)Dt−1 − Yt + ptCt + It + Φ(Kt −Kt−1) (1.19)
Note that, qtMt is eliminated from the resource constraint because of our assumption
that the economy has an abundant supply of fossil fuels and that firms’ expenditure
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on fossil fuels in the form of pollution tariff revenue is returned to the households in
a lump sum.
The trade balance is defined as domestic production minus domestic absorption.
tbt = Y (At, Kt−1,Mt, Ht)− ptCt − It − Φ(Kt −Kt−1) (1.20)
The economy’s net asset position captures the capital flow, and the current account
is the net of the trade balance and the serviced debt amount.
cat = tbt −Rt−1 ∗Dt−1 (1.21)
Note that the government balances the budget each period, and Gt is the transfer
from the government. Then, the import tariff revenue or any government collection
from environmental policy are eliminated from the resource constraint since these
components are returned to the representative household in a lump sum.
1.2.1 Functional Forms
We employ a Cobb-Douglas utility function with an intertemporal elasticity of
substitution across periods as is standard in the literature
U(Ct, Ht) =
[Cαt (1−Ht)1−α]1−σ − 1
1− σ (1.22)
where, α is the share of income that households spend on consumption, and σ is
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution across periods (also known as the relative
risk-aversion parameter).
Production has a Cobb-Douglas function with the constant returns to scale Yt =
At K
α1
t−1 M
α2
t H
1−α1−α2
t . The adjustment cost of investment has a quadratic function
Φ(Kt −Kt−1) = φ2 (Kt −Kt−1)2 where, φ(> 0) is an adjustment cost shift parameter.
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1.3 Steady State Analysis
This section solves for the economy’s response to the introduction of each of the
selected policies in the absence of shocks. In the steady state, there is no uncertainty
in the economy, and the system is in long-run equilibrium; therefore, we abstract by
using time subscripts. Incorporating the functional forms and the household’s and
firm’s problems, the steady state is represented by the following ratios
z :
H
1−H =
α
1− α(1− α1 − α2)
(1 + λ2CAPY )
p c
(1.23)
k :
K
Y
=
α1 (1 + λ2CAPY )
R∗ + δ
(1.24)
m :
M
Y
=
α2(1 + λ2CAPY )
q + λ2
(1.25)
c :
C
Y
=
1
p
(
1− δk −R∗d¯) (1.26)
where, z is the labor-leisure ratio, and k, m and c are the capital-to-output, emission-
to-output, and consumption-to-output ratios, respectively. d¯ is the long-run debt
such that the debt-to-output ratio is equal to the long-run ratio of the small economy
under consideration.
No policy
In the environmental policy’s absence, λ2 = 0 yielding the capital-to-output ratio
k = α1
R∗+δ , emission-to-output ratio m =
α2
q
, and the consumption-to-output ratio
c =
(
1− δα1
R∗+δ −R∗d¯
)
1
p
. We note that the ratio c is smaller compared to that in
a closed economy because of the debt-servicing requirement in an open economy.
We find the labor-leisure ratio z = α
1−α
(1−α1−α2)
(1− δα1R∗+δ−R∗d¯)
under no policy. Increases in
the debt-to-output ratio are associated with increased employment in this economy
compared to the closed economy since more output is needed to service the debt.
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Cap and Trade
Under a cap-and-trade system, the government imposes a fixed cap on emissions
to regulate pollution. In this policy, the emission is bounded by exogenous
level of M¯ = CAP and CAPY = 0. This provides emission-to-output ratio
m = α2
q+λ2
, capital-output ratio k = α1
R∗+δ , and consumption-to-output ratio of
c =
(
1− δα1
R∗+δ −R∗d¯
) (
1
p
)
. We find the labor-leisure ratio z = α
1−α
(1−α1−α2)
(1− δα1R∗+δ−R∗d¯)
.
Under this policy, the effective shadow price λ2 =
α2−q m
m
restricts the emissions level
to M¯ .
Tax
In the case of an environmental tax policy, the government imposes a constant
pollution tax (T ) charged for each unit of pollution. In our model, the effective shadow
price λ2 is the corresponding emissions tax rate that reduces emissions to CAP (i.e.
λ2 = T ). The tax rate restricts the emissions level in the steady state equivalent to
that under the cap-and-trade policy. In such a case, tax revenue is distributed to
households in a lump sum transfer and CAPy = 0. We find the emission-to-output
ratio m = α2
q+T
, capital-to-output ratio k = α1
R∗+δ , and consumption-to-output ratio
of c =
(
1− δα1
R∗+δ −R∗d¯
) (
1
p
)
. We find the labor-leisure ratio z = α
1−α
(1−α1−α2)
(1− δα1R∗+δ−R∗d¯)
.
These ratios are similar to that under the cap-and-trade policy. The tax rate required
to restrict the emission under this policy is T = α2−q m
m
.
Intensity Target
For an intensity target, the government requires a maximum fixed ratio of emissions-
per-unit output m¯ = M
Y
. Then, the intensity target policy can be represented by
CAP (Y ) = M¯ = m¯ Y where M¯ is the emission level restricted under the cap-
and-trade policy. Since CAPY = m¯ and emission-to-output ratio m = m¯, we find
the capital-to-output ratio k = α1(1+λ2m¯)
R∗+δ . The consumption-to-output ratio c =
1
p
(
1− δα1(1+λ2m¯)
R∗+δ −R∗d¯
)
. The labor-leisure ratio z = α
1−α
(1−α1−α2)(1+λ2m¯)(
1− δα1(1+λ2m¯)
R∗+δ −R∗d¯
) . Under
this policy, the effective shadow price λ2 =
α2−qm¯
m¯(1−α2) restricts emissions to the same
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level under the cap-and-trade policy. The shadow price is bigger than that under the
cap-and-trade policy, meaning the emission-to-output ratio under the intensity target
that restricts the emissions level equivalent to the cap-and-trade policy is smaller,
yielding outputs under this policy higher than those under the cap-and-trade policy.
1.4 Numerical Analysis
1.4.1 Data Aggregation and Model Calibration
In this section, we summarize the long-run empirical relationships used to identify
our model’s deep structural parameters. The long-run relationship corresponds to
Canada’s historical annual expenditure-based GDP for 1981-2010. This information
is available from Statistics Canada.7 The model is further parameterized such that the
calibrated economy’s structure simulates the Canadian economy’s business cycles.8
To be consistent with our model specification, GDP is calculated by netting out
government expenditure. Households’ consumption includes goods and services,
investment includes gross fixed-capital formation, and net export of goods and services
accounts for trade flows. For the terms of trade, we use the export and import prices
in the Penn World Table, which is available for 1950-2010.9.
The deep structural parameter values used in the steady state to represent
Canada’s historical economy are shown in Table 2.1, and the key macroeconomic
ratios in the steady state are shown in Table 1.2. During the period considered,
households’ consumption of goods and services accounts for 68% of GDP, investment
accounts for 26%, and the net export of goods and services accounts for the remaining
GDP (6%). The average compensation to employees is 45% of gross outputs during
7Source: Statistics Canada. Table 380-0106 - Gross domestic product.
8The second moments in our model are consistent with the literature.
9For more details, see PWT 8.1 in Feenstra et al. (2015)
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the period.10 We set 0.45 as the labor share in outputs. For the share of fossil
fuel expenditures, we follow Fischer and Springborn (2011) and estimate the share
as 9% of GDP.11 We set the share of capital α1 = 0.46 and the share of fossil fuel
expenditure α2 = 0.09. The exogenous international interest rate is fixed at 4% per
annum; the annual depreciation rate of capital is fixed at 10%; the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution across periods is fixed at 2. These amounts are standard
in the literature. The persistency parameters and the standard deviation correspond
to data from the Penn World Table.12 We estimate uni-variate AR(1) processes for
the total factor productivity and the relative price of imports-to-exports to set the
persistency of total factor productivity and the terms of trade, which are 0.533 and
0.319, respectively. The corresponding standard deviations of the shocks are 0.0149
and 0.0296, respectively. Since our sample period captures recent years, the estimates
for the total factor productivity shock are a slightly higher than those in the literature
(Uribe, 2013).
The parameters’ values d¯, α, ψ and φ are chosen to mimic the dynamic
performance of the Canadian economy’s business cycles as found in the literature. We
set d¯ = 0.909 such that the long-run trade balance to GDP ratio in our model is 0.0638
to match the historical average trade flow share of goods and services to the GDP
in the sample period. The share of income that households spend on consumption is
calibrated as 33% (α = 0.33) such that households’ labor supply in the steady state
is 27%. The country-specific risk premium is set at ψ = 0.0742 to match the dynamic
performance of trade balance and current account as shown in the literature. We
choose a hp-filter of smoothing parameter 100 to filter the trend in our calibrated
model. Table 1.3 provides the calibrated model’s theoretical second moments.
10The compensation is calculated over the sample period. Source: Statistics Canada. Table 383-
0032 - Multifactor productivity, gross output, value-added, capital, labor and intermediate inputs
at a detailed industry level by the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS).
11We also find that the share of abatement cost expenditure in manufacturing outputs is 7.5%
in Canada as reported in surveys conducted during 1996-2010. However, these estimates are not
reported regularly (Source: Canadian Statistics).
12See appendix for the details.
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The relative prices of consumption and fossil fuels in terms of the output’s world
price are set at 1 in the steady state. The total factor productivity is also set at 1
in the steady state. These normalizations let us evaluate the model’s responses to
shocks as cyclical responses rather than as a trend.
Table 1.1: Parameters in the Model
Parameter Description Value
Deep structural parameters
R∗ Exogenous international interest rate 0.04
α1 Capital share in output 0.46
α2 Energy expenditure share in output 0.09
1−α1−α2 Labor share in output 0.45
h¯ Household’s endowment of labor 1
δ Annual depreciation rate 0.1
ρA Autocorrelation of total factor productivity shock 0.533
ρp Autocorrelation of terms-of-trade shock 0.319
σA Standard deviation of the productivity shock 0.0149
σp Standard deviation of the terms-of-trade shock 0.0296
t¯b
Y Trade balance-to-output ratio 0.0644
Calibrated parameters
σ Intertemporal elasticity of substitution (risk parameter) 2
φ Shift parameter in capital adjustment cost 0.008
ψ Country specific risk-premium 0.0742
α Share of consumption expenditure on households’ income 0.33
d¯ Long-term debt level 0.909
1.4.2 Deterministic Responses to Environmental Policies
The economic responses under a deterministic case is shown in Table 1.4. In the
absence of uncertainty, no difference exists between the cap-and-trade and tax policies;
but the intensity target produces higher levels of consumption, labor supply, outputs,
investment, and capital stocks than the cap-and-trade or tax policies. These findings
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Table 1.2: Empirical and Steady State Performance of the Model
Description
Canadian Data
(1981-2010)
Model
Trade balance-to-GDP ratio 6.44% 6.38%
Consumption-to-GDP ratio 67.68% 64.70%
Debt-to-GDP ratio 160.90% 159.49%
Table 1.3: Theoretical Second Moments of the Model
Standard deviation Auto-correlation
Correlation with
GDP
GDP 2.20 0.47 1
Consumption 0.71 0.54 0.91
Capital 1.01 0.43 0.97
Labor supply 1.15 0.49 0.98
Trade-balance/GDP -0.20 -0.18
Current account/GDP -0.18 -0.19
Note: The theoretical second moments are for one standard deviation shock to total factor
productivity. Standard deviations are measured in percentage points from the theoretical mean.
Table 1.4: Steady-State Levels Across Policies
Policy Cases % Change from No Policy
Variables
No
policy
Cap-and-
Trade
Tax
Intensity
Target
Cap-and-
Trade
Tax
Intensity
Target
Output 0.570 0.550 0.550 0.568 -3.4% -3.4% -0.2%
Consumption 0.346 0.333 0.333 0.341 -3.8% -3.8% -1.3%
Investment 0.188 0.181 0.181 0.191 -3.4% -3.4% 1.7%
Labor supply 0.272 0.272 0.272 0.278 0.0% 0.0% 2.2%
Capital Stock 1.876 1.811 1.811 1.908 -3.4% -3.4% 1.7%
Emissions 0.051 0.041 0.041 0.041 -20% -20% -20%
are consistent with our analytical analysis. GDP decreases by 3.4% under the
cap-and-trade and tax cases while it decreases by 0.2% under the intensity target.
Consumption falls by 3.8% from no policy under the cap-and-trade or tax cases, but
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the fall is 1.3% under the intensity target. Investment decreases by 3.4% under the
cap-and-trade and tax cases while investment increases by 1.7% under the intensity
target case. Under the cap-and-trade and tax cases, the labor supply remains similar
to the no-policy case, but the supply of labor increases by 2.2% under the intensity
target. This means, to maintain the same emissions level from the cap-and-trade case
under the intensity target, firms substitute emissions with labor and capital which are
clean inputs. Furthermore, the required ratio under the intensity target to maintain
the same level of emissions, as explained in the analytical analysis, is stricter than
under the cap-and-trade. As a result, the labor supply and investment are higher
than the no-policy baseline, but the increment in inputs is not that much higher than
in the no-policy case to affect the outputs in order to increase. Also, the permit price
under the intensity target case must increase by 27.4% compared to the cap-and-trade
case.
1.4.3 Uncertainty and Environmental Policy
This section evaluates the dynamic properties of the emissions tax, cap-and-trade,
and intensity target in the presence of uncertainties. We simulate the uncertain
economic growth by employing an exogenous temporary stochastic shock to the total
factor productivity and separately, a shock to the terms of trade through an exogenous
temporary positive stochastic shock to the world’s relative price of imports to exports,
meaning an adverse terms-of-trade shock.13 We compute the first and second moments
of the key macroeconomic variables and trace their impulse response functions. The
simulation results are computed using the “pure” perturbation method, which relies
on a second-order Taylor approximation of the model around its initial steady state.14
Table 1.5 shows the environmental policies imposed in our model.
13Our relative price of consumption is the ratio of import price to export price, which is inverse
to the terms of trade definition.
14The model is solved in Dynare. See Adjemian et al. (2011) for more details.
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Table 1.5: Static Level of Environment Policies Imposed in the Model
Cap-and-
Trade
Emissions
Tax
Intensity Target
Policy 0.041 0.207 0.722
Note: The Cap-and-Trade policy 0.041 represents 20% reduction of emissions from the no policy
case. Emissions Tax of 0.207 represents per unit emissions tax and intensity target of 0.722 is the
fixed ratio of emission to output. Note that policies in the steady state yield the 20% reduction of
emissions from the no policy case. Also, note that a stricter intensity target is necessary to maintain
the same level of emissions.
Productivity Shock
In this section, we describe the economy’s responses under uncertain economic growth
as the result of one period of temporary productivity shock with a magnitude of one
standard deviation. First, we solve the model for the no-policy case, a baseline
scenario with no additional environmental regulations. Then as in Fischer and
Springborn (2011), we model a 20% emission reduction from the steady-state level of
emissions from the no-policy case.15 Therefore, we model an emissions cap at 20%
below the baseline emissions level and then introduce emission taxes and intensity
targets such that the amount of emission reductions is the same across each of the
environmental policies in the steady state.
Figure 1.1 and 1.2 plot the impulse response functions of several variables on
interest to a total factor productivity shock of 1 standard deviation in period 0 under
the four different policies: i) no policy, ii) cap-and-trade, iii) emission tax, and iv)
intensity target. The model is simulated for 10,000 periods, and the first 100 periods
are discarded. We use the Hodrick-Prescott filter (with a smoothing parameter of
100) before recording the statistical moments, and the responses are plotted in terms
of deviation from the steady-state level of each variable. The model predicts an
15The European Union has a target reducing emissions 20% from 1990 levels by 2020, and both the
Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman bills proposed in the U.S. Congress targeted a 20% emissions
reduction.
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increase in outputs, consumption, labor, investment, debt and interest rate as well as
a deterioration of the trade-balance. The consumption’s initial response is relatively
smaller by an order of magnitude of two than the initial investment response. As
the domestic absorption (consumption and investment) is higher than the domestic
production, the trade balance’s initial response is negative, leading to a rise in debt
and, thus, the risk premium on interest rate. As a result, the effective interest rate
increases, affecting households’ consumption smoothing behavior over time. This
effect means that although consumption is dominated by the positive income effect
compared to the negative price effect, households save most of their increased income,
showing the price effect’s significant influence on consumption.
Under the cap-and-trade policy, which fixes emissions level, outputs are dampened.
As a result, households save relatively less to smooth consumption compared to the
no-policy case. The effective interest rate increases relatively less than in the no-policy
case, leading to dampened consumption over time. However, under the emissions tax
policy, which fixes the emissions’ price allow emissions to rise leading to relatively
higher outputs than the cap-and-trade policy. As a result, households save relatively
more under the emissions tax policy to smooth consumption but not as much as
in the no-policy case. The effective interest rate’s increase under the emissions tax
is relatively higher than under the cap-and-trade policy but not higher than in the
no-policy case. This leads to dampened consumption but relatively less dampened
than with the cap-and-trade policy. Under the intensity target, a stricter level of
emissions-to-output ratio is required to maintain the same emissions level under the
cap-and-trade, leading to a relatively bigger rise in outputs and thus savings, which
dampen consumption over time but less than in the no-policy case.
The literature discusses variations in economic variables across the business cycle
to evaluate environmental policies. We follow this precedent by calculating the
coefficient of variation (CV) across the business cycle for each environmental policy
and for the no-policy baseline. The results are reported in Table 1.6. Each CV
provides a measure of the corresponding variable’s dispersion as a percentage of
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its theoretical mean. We find that the cap-and-trade policy consistently has the
lowest CV for the economic variables. For emissions, this finding is obvious; after
the positive productivity shock, the emissions level remains unchanged at 20% below
the baseline case, so there is no variation. This inflexible emissions cap reduces
the positive productivity shock’s benefits so that output, consumption, investment,
labor, capital, debt, and trade flows all increase less under a cap-and-trade policy
than under the other policy instruments. Thus, the cap-and-trade policy reduces the
real business cycle’s severity, a finding which is consistent with the results in Fischer
and Springborn (2011).16 Under the tax policy, the variations of consumption, labor,
and output are similar from those of the no policy, except that investment is higher
in the tax case. Under the intensity target, variations are not very different than in
the no-policy case.
We also check the results’ robustness by employing the higher magnitude and
higher persistency shock, which helps to magnify the differences in responses across
the policies. The results for the shock of 1.5 standard deviation with a 90% persistency
level are shown in the appendix (Table A.2 and in Figures A.1 and A.2). We find
similar results. The cap-and-trade policy dampens the shock’s intensity, and the
emissions tax policy has higher variation, whereas the intensity target policy has
variation similar to that of the no-policy case.
Terms of Trade Shock
In this section, we describe the economy’s dynamic responses to the negative terms
of trade shock as a result of import competition, such as a surge of trade flows from
China. To do so, we model the terms-of-trade shock as a one standard deviation
positive shock to the relative price of consumption. As under the productivity shock,
the model is solved for the no-policy case and for the three environmental policies that
16The model is symmetric so a negative productivity shock modeling the business cycle’s trough
would give the same results. Reduced economic activity would reduce both the cap’s shadow price
and the shock’s negative impact, once again dampening the business cycle.
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Table 1.6: Variations Under the Productivity Shock
Variables No policy Cap Tax
Intensity
Target
Consumption 0.71 0.61 0.71 0.71
Labor 1.15 1.01 1.15 1.14
Investment 10.29 8.86 10.48 10.13
Output 2.20 1.92 2.21 2.19
Emission 2.20 0.00 2.21 2.19
Note: The table shows the coefficient of variations for 1 standard deviation positive temporary shock
to the total factor productivity. The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation divided by the
theoretical mean level (in percentage points).
reduce 20% emission from the no-policy case’s emissions level in the steady state. As
before, the model is simulated for 10,000 periods, the first 100 periods are discarded,
and the Hodrick-Prescott filter (with a smoothing parameter of 100) is employed.
Figure 1.3 and 1.4 plot interesting variables’ impulse response functions across the
four policies: i) no policy, ii) cap-and-trade, iii) emission tax, and iv) intensity target.
The negative terms-of-trade shock generate the inverse of the variables’ path from
the productivity shock. As evident in the empirical literature, the model predicts
a decline in consumption, outputs, labor, and investment. Also, in response to the
shock, the trade balance deteriorates and debts increase, leading to an increased
interest rate, also noted under the productivity shock. In response to the negative
terms-of-trade shock, the initial decline in consumption is relatively larger than the
decline in investments. Households dissave in response to declining outputs to smooth
consumption even though consumption is declining. In the model, however, the initial
decline in domestic absorption (consumption and investment) is smaller than the
decline in domestic production, leading to deterioration in the trade balance. This
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Figure 1.1: Impulse Responses Under the Productivity Shock (Panel A)
Note: The figures show the impulse response functions of output, consumption, labor, capital,
emissions, debt, current account, and trade balance in response to the positive productivity shock
of one standard deviation as shown on the bottom-right corner panel of Figure 1.2. Zero on the
vertical axis on each graph represents corresponding variable’s steady-state level. The responses
are in terms of deviation from the steady-state level.
deterioration leads to an increase in the effective interest rate, suggesting an increase
in return on investment. Thus, both the income effect and the price effect negatively
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Figure 1.2: Impulse Responses Under the Productivity Shock (Panel B)
Note: Note: The figures show the impulse response functions of output, consumption, labor, capital,
emissions, debt, current account and trade balance in response to the positive productivity shock
of one standard deviation as shown on the bottom right corner panel. Zero on the vertical axis on
each graph represents corresponding variable’s the steady state level. The responses are in terms
of deviation from the steady state level.
influences the households’ consumption. As a result, we see a stronger consumption
response to the negative terms-of-trade shock.
In response to the import shock, the fixed emissions level in the cap-and-trade
policy yields a smaller decline in output than in the no-policy case. This leads to a
smaller decline in investment. Households dissave relatively less than in the no-policy
case, leading to an increased interest rate compared to the no-policy case. This is
driven by a stronger price effect on consumption relative to the no-policy case. In
the emissions tax policy, which fixes the emissions price, the decline in output is
relatively higher than in the cap-and-trade policy. Households respond by dissaving
relatively more than the cap-and-trade policy, leading to a smaller increase in the
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interest rate. This means consumption is affected relatively less by the price effect
under an emissions tax. In the intensity target ratio, the decline in output is relatively
bigger than in the cap-and-trade and emissions tax policy but smaller than in the
no-policy case. Households respond by disinvestment, which is relatively bigger than
the cap-and-trade and emissions tax policy, leading to the smallest rise in interest
rate. This means that under the intensity target the price effect has the smallest
effect on consumption compared to the cap-and-trade and emissions tax.
Table 1.7 shows CVs under the terms-of-trade shock. Consumption has higher
variation compared to the productivity shock. However, we do not see any significant
difference in terms of which policy is to be pursued to reduce the terms of trade
shock’s severity on consumption and labor. The cap-and-trade policy consistently has
the lowest CV for the economic variables, but the variations in terms of percentage
change are very small in differences across the policy instruments, with the exception
of investment and trade balance. The CVs of the investment and trade balance
under the cap-and-trade is significantly lower compared to other policy instruments.
This finding is in line with our intuition that the cap-and-trade policy has stronger
price effects under the terms-of-trade shock. Therefore, the cap-and-trade policy
is not different from the other two environmental policies in reducing the terms-of-
trade shock, especially if consumption and labor are considered. However, the cap-
and-trade policy does reduce the shock’s intensity on investment and trade balance,
meaning the policy instrument is effective in limiting imports and investment.
We also check the results’ robustness by employing the shock of higher magnitude
and higher persistency. As before, the higher magnitude and persistent shock
magnifies the differences in variation across policy instruments. The results for 1.5
standard deviation shocks with 90% persistency level are shown in the appendix
(Table A.3, in Figure A.3, and in A.4). We find similar results. The cap-and-trade
policy has little effect on consumption and labor, and is equivalent to the other policy
instruments. As explained above, the cap-and-trade reduces the shock’s intensity on
trade balance and investment.
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Table 1.7: Variations Under the Terms of Trade Shock
Variables No policy Cap Tax
Intensity
Target
Consumption 2.20 2.19 2.20 2.20
Labor 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.52
Investment 1.39 1.24 1.39 1.35
Output 0.25 0.22 0.25 0.24
Emission 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.24
Trade balance 2.72 2.53 2.70 2.67
Note: The table shows the coefficient of variation under 1 standard deviation negative temporary
shock to the terms of trade, which is employed using a positive shock to the relative price of
consumption in the model. The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation divided by the
theoretical mean level (in percentage points).
Correlated Shocks
In the introduction, we discuss the terms-of-trade shock considering the potential link
of business cycles to the fluctuations in the terms of trade. As we noted, responses
under the terms-of-trade shock are not different from productivity shock for key
macroeconomic variables, but these shocks are seldom uncorrelated. Then we ask
the following questions: What are the effects on macroeconomic dynamics across the
selected environmental policy instruments if the two shocks are correlated? Is there
any condition under which the correlated shocks have influence on the macroeconomic
dynamics? To answer these questions, we now employ correlated shocks, instead of
separate shocks, as follows:
27
-
.
00
15
-
.
00
1
-
.
00
05
0
0 20 40 60
Period
Output
-
.
00
8
-
.
00
6
-
.
00
4
-
.
00
2
0
0 20 40 60
Period
Consumption
-
.
00
15
-
.
00
1
-
.
00
05
0
.
00
05
0 20 40 60
Period
Labor
-
.
00
3
-
.
00
2
-
.
00
1
0
0 20 40 60
Period
Investment
-
.
00
01
5
-
.
00
01
-
.
00
00
5
0
0 20 40 60
Period
No Policy Cap
Tax Int. Target
Emissions
0
.
00
00
5
.
00
01
.
00
01
5
0 20 40 60
Period
No Policy Cap
Tax Int. Target
Interest Rate
Figure 1.3: Impulse Responses Under the Terms of Trade Shock (Panel A)
Note: The figures show the impulse response functions of output, consumption, labor, capital,
emissions, debt, current account, and trade balance in response to the terms of trade shock of one
standard deviation by employing a positive shock to the relative price of consumption as shown
on the bottom right corner panel in Figure 1.4. Zero on the vertical axis on each graph represents
corresponding variable’s steady state level. The responses are in terms of percentage deviation from
the steady-state level.
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Figure 1.4: Impulse Responses Under the Terms of Trade Shock (Panel B)
Note: The figures show the impulse response functions of debt, current account, and trade balance
in response to the terms of trade shock of one standard deviation by employing a positive shock to
the relative price of consumption as shown on the bottom right corner panel. Zero on the vertical
axis on each graph represents corresponding variable’s steady state level. The responses are in
terms of deviation from the steady state level.
where, ν = corr(At , pt) is the correlation parameter between the two shocks. Our
estimation shows that the correlation between the two innovations as -0.0045.17
Table 1.8 shows the results under the correlated positive total factor productivity
and negative terms-of-trade shocks.18 The CVs are higher under the correlated shocks,
but the results on smoothing the business cycles’ intensity are similar to that under
the productivity shocks. The cap-and-trade policy reduces the intensity of business
17The correlation is estimated using the two residual series from the univariate AR(1) process of
the total factor productivity and terms of trade (hp-filtered with smoothing parameter 100).
18We also employ the productivity shock correlated with the terms-of-trade shock and separate
terms-of-trade shock correlated with the productivity shock. In each case, the results are
qualitatively similar to when faced with a separate shock. The separate shocks are more dominant
than the correlated shock.
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cycles’ shocks, and this result holds under both positively and negatively correlated
shocks. Therefore, the consumption smoothing under the terms-of-trade shocks fades
away when these shocks are weakly correlated. However, we find that the correlation’s
degree and direction between the two shocks may influence the dynamic performance.
The stronger the positive correlation across the two shocks, the more consumption
smoothing occurs regardless of the environmental policy instruments, making those
policy instruments equivalent in terms of variation on consumption. Table A.5 in the
appendix shows the effects under higher correlations. We do not find such an effect
on other variables, and their variations decrease under the cap-and-trade policy.
Table 1.8: Variations Under Correlated Shocks
Variables No policy Cap Tax
Intensity
Target
ν = −0.0045
Consumption 2.28 2.25 2.28 2.28
Labor 1.25 1.11 1.25 1.23
Investment 10.46 9.01 10.65 10.30
Output 2.20 1.92 2.21 2.19
Emission 2.20 0.0 2.21 2.19
ν = 0.0045
Consumption 2.28 2.24 2.28 2.28
Labor 1.24 1.11 1.25 1.23
Investment 10.45 9.00 10.64 10.29
Output 2.20 1.92 2.21 2.19
Emission 2.20 0.00 2.21 2.19
Note: The table shows the coefficient of variations under 1 standard deviation temporary correlated
shocks of the terms of trade and total factor productivity. The coefficient of variation is the standard
deviation divided by the theoretical mean level (in percentage points).
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1.5 Welfare Cost
We follow the common practice in the emerging environmental macro literature and
calculate welfare costs of environmental policy instruments. For each environmental
policy instrument, we measure the reduction in consumption from the no-policy case,
which would be necessary to make households indifferent between the no-policy case
and the environmental policy cases. To do so, for each policy instrument, we calculate
the discounted welfare’s present value, keeping the supply of labor fixed at the steady-
state level in the no-policy case. To ensure the consumption variable’s response
converges to the steady-state level, we choose 100 periods in the simulation.
Table 1.9 shows the changes in welfare cost across the policy cases as a difference
from the welfare under the no-policy case.19 Under the productivity shocks, the
results show that the cap-and-trade policy has the highest welfare cost across the
policy instruments while the intensity target has the lowest welfare cost; but the
welfare cost difference is about 0.04 percentage point between cap-and-trade and tax
policies, supporting the result in Fischer and Springborn (2011). However, under
the terms-of-trade shock, the cap-and-trade’s welfare cost is lower than the emissions
tax policy by about 1 percentage point, making the two policies’ welfare costs not
significantly different. The intensity target has the lowest welfare cost irrespective of
the shocks. The results also hold for highly persistent and higher magnitude shocks
(See Table A.4 in appendix).
1.6 Conclusions
Policy makers are faced with a variety of instruments to limit pollution emissions.
Among many important criteria such as cost effectiveness and political feasibility,
emerging literature suggests that considering environmental policy’s impact across
the business cycle is also important. As countries become increasingly integrated into
19Note that the welfare cost does not include improvement in welfare from reduced emissions level
under the environmental policy instruments.
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Table 1.9: Welfare Differences Across Environmental Policy Instruments
Change from No Policy % Change from No Policy
Description
No pol-
icy
Cap-and-
Trade
Tax
Intensity
Target
Cap-and-
Trade
Tax
Intensity
Target
Productivity Shock
Change in welfare -0.5834 -0.5765 -0.1970 -3.19% -3.15% -1.08%
Terms of Trade Shock
Change in welfare -0.5767 -0.5774 -0.1968 -3.14% -3.15% -1.07%
Note: The table shows the differences in welfare across environmental policy instruments from the
no-policy case in response to productivity and terms of trade shocks of 1 standard deviation. In
estimating the changes, total welfare is calculated as the sum of discounted utility, keeping the
supply of labor fixed from the steady state under the no-policy case.
the world economy, the environmental policy’s impact on trade flows has also become
a consideration. To address these questions, we develop a DSGE model incorporating
international trade and capital mobility. We then evaluate a pollution tax, a cap-
and-trade policy, and an intensity target in response to the business cycles that may
arise from uncertainty in the total factor productivity or the terms of trade.
We find that cap-and-trade reduces the business cycle’s intensity caused by
the productivity shock. However, we do not see a significant difference across
environmental policy instruments if the terms of trade causes the business cycle,
especially on key macroeconomic variables: consumption and labor. With an
exception, under the terms-of-trade shock, the cap-and-trade is still the most effective
policy instrument to reduce the trade flows’ variation, meaning the policy is effective
in limiting import surges. Our results show that the cap-and-trade policy strongly
reduces the macroeconomic dynamics in response to environmental policies under
productivity shock. These findings support the results of Fischer and Springborn
(2011) and Annicchiarico and Dio (2015), but the results under the terms-of-trade
shock differ from that of the literature. When these shocks are correlated, our
results support the finding that the cap-and-trade policy reduces the business cycle’s
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intensity. However, if the shocks are positively but highly correlated, then the
variation on consumption across the environmental policy instruments are equivalent.
The welfare cost is the lowest under the intensity target, irrespective of the shocks.
The cap-and-trade policy has a higher welfare cost than the emissions tax in the event
of productivity shock, but the difference in the welfare cost between the cap-and-
trade and emissions tax policies is small. In the event of the terms-of-trade shock,
the welfare costs under the cap-and trade are lower than those of the emissions tax
policies, but the difference is nearly indistinguishable. These results also hold for
larger and highly persistent shocks.
Evaluating environmental policies’ macroeconomic dynamics in an open-economy
modeling framework that incorporates trade and capital flows is itself an important
venture, which is also discussed in Fischer and Heutel (2013). We believe that
our study represents a beginning with several possible extensions in the spirit
of incorporating environmental policy into open-economy macroeconomic dynamic
models.
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Chapter 2
Emissions Leakage, Environmental
Policy and Trade Frictions
2.1 Introduction
Unilateral changes in environmental policy in one region may cause countries with
weaker environmental regulation to increase production of pollution-intensive goods.
The associated increase in emissions in these regions is known as emissions leakage.
The issue of carbon leakage has been a particular concern to policy makers because
of the lack of global consensus on policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Countries that have considered regulating emissions in the absence of coordinated
global action have been concerned that production in polluting sectors would
relocate to unregulated jurisdictions, thus reducing domestic employment without
a corresponding reduction in pollution emissions.
In this study we develop a two-good, one-factor, small open-economy model with
pollution emissions associated with one of the goods’ production. We show that the
level of leakage from a unilateral strengthening in environmental regulation depends
on the level of trade frictions in the model. We present a special case of our model
with free trade in the dirty good (which we term manufacturing), but the clean good
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(services) is not traded. We show that increases in the stringency of environmental
regulation, which we model as a pollution tax, do not affect emissions in the rest of
the world. In other words, unilateral environmental regulation is associated with zero
emissions leakage when no trade is in the clean good.
This result demonstrates the importance of carefully modeling trade costs when
evaluating emissions leakage’s consequences from a unilateral change in environmental
policy. In our model with no trade in services, an increased pollution tax causes a
reduction in the relative price of services, but no corresponding change in the price
of the polluting good relative to its world price. This leads to an equal reduction
in domestic consumption and output of the polluting good and, thus, zero leakage.
The consumption and production of services increase the same amount. When we
model positive levels of trade in services, we find leakage consistent with the existing
literature. We use the model to analytically decompose the changes’ impact in the rest
of the world’s emissions after a unilateral strengthening of domestic environmental
regulation in three distinct channels: income effect, output effect and terms-of-trade
effect.
We find that the income effect causes negative leakage. Pollution tax increases
lead to a reduction in consumers’ real wages, thus reducing consumption. As a result,
the exports of manufacturing goods increase, and the rest of the world’s production
decreases by a corresponding amount. Through the income effect, increases in the
pollution tax lead to decreases in the rest of the world’s emissions, if all else is equal.
The output and terms-of-trade effects cause positive leakage. Through the
output effect, increased pollution tax leads to a decline in the manufacturing sector’s
production. This decline decreases the exports of manufacturing goods, and the rest of
the world’s production (and pollution emissions) increases to fill the gap. In the terms-
of-trade effect, a pollution tax increase leads to a relative price increase, reducing the
manufacturing sector’s terms of trade. This reduction has two impacts on our model.
First, exports of manufacturing goods decrease, and again foreign production and
pollution emissions rise in response. Secondly, the relative price change also reduces
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domestic consumption of manufactured goods as households begin using services that
increase exportation of manufacturing goods and that lead to declining production
in the rest of the world. We show that the effect on production dominates the effect
on consumption and that the net terms-of-trade effect causes positive leakage.
While we can analytically sign the leakage effects in the model, their relative
magnitudes depend on parameters and initial values. To compare the effects’ size, we
calibrate our model to the Canadian economy. In simulations of services’ trade costs
taken from the literature, emissions leakage is 18% higher than when we simulate
free trade in services. The simulations also demonstrate that among the channels in
our model the terms-of-trade effect dominates. The income effect, which could be
a source of negative leakage (decreasing the rest of the world’s emissions) from an
emissions tax increase is more than an order of magnitude smaller than the other
two effects. For the chosen set of parameter values, we find positive leakage for all
non-zero levels of the service sector’s trade.
Two distinct methods are used in the literature to study leakage: analytical and
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. Among analytical models, recent
studies have focused on identifying channels through which leakage operates and
on exploring the potential for negative leakage. Karp (2013) develops a two-good
(clean and dirty), two-factor, one-country model with both goods freely traded. The
study decomposes emissions leakage into two effects: income effects and production
effects. The reallocation of factors across the two sectors in his model because of an
environmental policy causes the income and production effects. He argues that, if
income effect is dominant, an increased environmental regulation may cause negative
emissions leakage.
Modeling a two-good, two-factor, two-country framework, Baylis et al. (2014)
shows that the emissions leakage depends on the two elasticities of substitution:
the elasticity of substitution between the two-factor inputs in production, and the
elasticity of substitution between the two commodities. The authors decompose
leakage into the terms-of-trade effect (TOT) and the abatement resource effect (ARE).
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An increased price of the home-country’s good leads to positive leakage as consumers
substitute with the other country’s good (the terms-of-trade effect). Firms in the
dirty sector substitute dirty inputs with clean inputs, leading to negative leakage (the
abatement resource effect). In this study we focus on another potential avenue of
lower emissions leakage estimates. We demonstrate that an increase in environmental
regulation can be associated with less leakage if the service sector’s trade costs are
modeled directly.
Baylis et al. (2015) extends Baylis et al. (2014) to analytically decompose a CGE
model’s results into seven distinct leakage effects. We identify three analogous effects
in our model: income, output, and terms of trade. We also find that income has
negative effects and that output and terms of trade have positive effects on emissions
leakage. Many of the effects in Baylis et al. (2015) do not appear in our model
because of our focus on a small economy. Because our economy is a price taker,
its environmental policy has no impact on world prices.1 This assumption reduces
the number of channels through which environmental policy (or trade costs) can
affect emissions leakage, allowing us to focus on trade costs’ impact on leakage from
increased environmental regulation in the service sector. Because Baylis et al. (2015)
(and Baylis et al. (2014)) focus on environmental policy, they do not address trade
costs’ emissions leakage impact in the service sector.
Trade costs in services represent a significant barrier to free trade. In addition to
traditional tariffs, the service sector is exposed to a variety of non-tariff barriers.
Professional services often face technical standards, licensing requirements, and
language or cultural barriers that inhibit trade. Many personal services must be
provided on location in real time (for example, haircuts, restaurants and construction)
and are therefore untradeable.2
1For example, several researchers have modeled a “fuel price” effect, in which introducing
environmental regulation reduces dirty fuels’ global price. In these models the reduction in fuel
price is one of the largest sources of leakage. We assume our economy’s policy actions do not affect
world prices, so this effect is not present in our model.
2Anderson et al. (2013) finds that trade barriers in services in Canada are much larger than trade
barriers in goods. See Borchert et al. (2012) for more details on comparing service-trade restrictions
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Most of the leakage literature has focused on trade in the polluting sector. While
it is widely understood that in general equilibrium the linkage between the level of
trade across sectors would affect leakage, this concept has not been widely studied.
The impact that the clean sector’s trade costs can have on emissions leakage has
been largely overlooked.3 We show that at lower levels of service-sector trade costs, a
stricter environmental regulation is associated with less leakage for a service importer
and more leakage for a service exporter.
Our small open-economy framework is new to the leakage literature, but it has
been used in several studies that examine the relationship between trade and the
environment.4 One possible reason is that small open-economy models do not
explicitly quantify emissions in the rest of the world. However, assuming that
economies in the rest of the world are symmetric in emissions intensity but differ
only by the environmental regulation’s stringency, we show that the direction and
the determinants for emissions leakage can be evaluated in a small open-economy
model.5
While we use an analytical model to evaluate the impact of service sector’s
trade costs on leakage, our results also have implications for the many studies
that investigate emissions leakage using a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE)
framework. Paltsev (2001); Elliott et al. (2010a); Babiker (2005) each have developed
multi-regional CGE models of the world to estimate a magnitude of leakage under an
environmental regulation. These studies present net results and do not identify the
effects of trade costs in services on emissions leakage. Typically, theoretical models
assume trade costs in services to be zero, potentially because the costs are difficult
to quantify across all the countries or regions modeled.6
across over 100 countries. See van der Marel and Ben (2013) for a discussion on different types of
services’ trade costs.
3See Hoel (1996) for a notable exception.
4See Copeland (1994) and Copeland and Taylor (2005) for examples.
5Different levels of emissions intensity between the domestic economy and that of the rest of the
world would merely scale our results up or down depending on the difference’s direction.
6Fugazza and Maur (2008) discusses the importance of modeling non-tariff barriers, which are a
form of trade costs, in a CGE model. Walsh (2006) reviews the difficulties in estimating trade costs
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CGE models that include services are calibrated to the realized trade flows in
services. This calibration implicitly fixes trade costs in services at the level in the
calibration data and implies the costs remain unchanged throughout the forecast
period. These studies suggest that a unilateral increase in carbon taxes may increase
emissions elsewhere in the world by as much as 10%-130% of the reductions in the
country that imposes the tax. Our results suggest that a fall in trade costs in services
could affect the estimated emissions leakage negatively (or positively) depending on
whether an economy imports (or exports) services.
Several studies also explore the potential for negative leakage in a CGE model
(see Elliott and Fullerton (2014); Baylis et al. (2013); Winchester and Rausch (2013);
Carbone (2013)). They analyze leakage with respect to various levels of counterfactual
elasticities across inputs and products in a CGE model. These studies find that
elasticities of substitution in the production and utility functions affect leakage. The
researchers also note little prospect of negative leakage (in a large multi-region model
of the United States) because of the assumption of small fossil fuel supply elasticities.
While our model is much simpler than these CGE models, incorporating a given level
of trade cost in services allows us to introduce another dimension across which leakage
may vary.7
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 outlines the model.
Section 2.3 solves the model and evaluates the impact of a small increase in the
emissions tax on leakage. To provide intuition, this section offers analytical solutions
for the amount of leakage in two special cases: i) free trade in goods with completely
non-traded services, and ii) free trade in goods and services. Then the marginal
effects of trade cost in services on the emissions leakage are investigated, and a more
general solution, showing how the amount of leakage varies with trade costs in the
in services. Neither of these studies focuses on the relationship between environmental policy and
leakage.
7Many of the channels through which environmental regulation can affect the rest of the world’s
emissions in these CGE models do not exist in our model. Most importantly, the small open economy
in our model is a price taker. Thus, it is difficult to predict how introducing trade costs into these
models may affect the results as compared to our simple (and tractable) model.
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service sector, is provided. Section 2.4 examines the relative magnitudes of leakage at
different levels of service sector’s trade costs by calibrating the model to the Canadian
macroeconomic data. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The Model
We model a small open economy with two representative sectors. A representative
firm in each sector produces one good: manufacturing (x) and services (y). The
manufacturing good is a composite good representing all goods that emit some level of
carbon during their production process. The service good represents all outputs that
do not emit any carbon during their production process.8 Initially, we assume that
manufacturing goods are freely traded internationally, but the service sector faces a
trade friction, which represents the degree of trade costs in services. These trade costs
may result from visa fees, required licenses or other professional standards, country-
specific technical standards, legal hurdles, or differences in language and culture. In
our model, we are agnostic about the types of barriers that cause these trade costs,
but we model them generally as iceberg trade costs. Initially, we assume a fixed world
price ratio for goods and services such that the economy exports manufacturing goods
and imports services from the rest of the world.9
On the demand side, we assume a representative domestic household that
consumes both manufactured goods and services to maximize utility. The household
has access to international debt at a fixed (world) interest rate R¯. The domestic
government’s role is limited to implementing an exogenous emissions tax per unit of
emissions in the manufacturing sector and redistributing revenues collected to the
households in a lump-sum transfer.10 The balance of payment in the economy is
unaffected by a change in environmental regulation.
8This classification is consistent with Levinson (2010), who finds that in the U.S. economy, services
account for a tiny fraction of overall emissions.
9This assumption is convenient because our application simulates the Canadian economy and
Canada is a service importer.
10For simplicity, we assume that the government maintains a balanced budget.
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In both sectors, if domestic absorption is greater (less) than domestic production,
the economy imports (exports) from (to) the rest of the world. Firms have the option
to abate emissions or pay an emissions tax. Although mobile across sectors, labor
is immobile across countries. For simplicity, we assume that population growth is
zero. The parameters and policy variables are assumed such that an interior solution
always exists for all decision variables.
We employ a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function with a
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregated over the consumption of goods
and services.
The representative household’s preferences are given by
U(cx, cy) =
{(
γ
1
ρ c
ρ−1
ρ
x + (1− γ) 1ρ c
ρ−1
ρ
y
) ρ
ρ−1
}1−σ
− 1
1− σ −D
S1+σ − 1
1 + σ
(2.1)
where, cx and cy are consumption of manufacturing goods and services, respectively,
γ ∈ (0, 1) is the weight in consumption of manufacturing goods, ρ is the constant
elasticity of substitution between goods and services each period, and σ is the constant
relative risk aversion parameter. We denote S as the stock of pollution emissions and
D ≥ 0 as the weight of dis-utility from pollution emissions. The stock of pollution
emissions S = e + erow, where e is the level of emissions and erow is the level of
emissions in the rest of the world. We assume that the representative household
inelastically supplies her labor (h¯) to firms (i.e. hx + hy = h¯), where hx is labor
supply to the manufacturing sector and hy is labor supply to the service sector. The
emissions’ stock is a negative externality that lowers utility but that has no effect on
production.11
11Copeland (1994) and Angelopoulos et al. (2010) each models pollution’s impact on consumers
in a similar way
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The household is subject to the following budget constraint
cx + p µ cy + R¯d¯ = wh¯+ pi +G (2.2)
where p is the fixed world relative price ratio of services to manufacturing goods and
µ is the trade factor defined such that pd = p µ represents domestic price. In a world
with costless trade in services µ = 1.12 The amount of debt servicing is R¯d¯. The real
wage per unit of labor supplied is w, and the real lump-sum transfer of tax revenues
from the government to the household is represented by G. The manufacturing good
is the numeraire with an assumed price of 1 so that all other prices can be interpreted
as units of the manufacturing goods’ price.
The representative household chooses cx and cy to maximize her utility (Eq. (2.1))
subject to her budget constraint (Eq. (2.2)). Using λ as the Lagrangian multiplier
for the budget constraint, the household’s maximization problem is represented by
the following Lagrangian:
max
cx,cy
L =
{(
γ
1
ρ c
ρ−1
ρ
x + (1− γ) 1ρ c
ρ−1
ρ
y
) ρ
ρ−1
}1−σ
− 1
1− σ + λ
{
wh¯+G− cx − p µ cy − R¯d¯
}
(2.3)
The first order conditions are
(
γ
1
ρ c
ρ−1
ρ
x + (1− γ) 1ρ c
ρ−1
ρ
y
) 1−σρ
ρ−1
(
γ
cx
) 1
ρ
= λ (2.4)
Cx
Cy
=
γ
1− γ
(
1
p µ
)−ρ
(2.5)
Eq. (2.4) ensures that the marginal utility from the consumption of goods is equal
to the marginal utility of income. Eq. (2.5) shows that households’ relative demand
12Note that µ can be defined as µ = 1 + f for service importers, where f is the iceberg trade
cost in services. For service exporters, µ = 11+f . If services are exported, then the domestic price
pd = p1+f . If services are imported, then the domestic relative price of services is p
d = p(1 + f).
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of the two consumption goods depends upon the world relative price ratio p, µ, ρ and
γ.
On the supply side, production in both sectors uses labor as the only input.13
The production function in the manufacturing sector is x = hα1x , and the production
function in the service sector is y = hα2y . The parameters α1 ∈ (0, 1) and α2 ∈
(0, 1) are the factor input elasticities in manufacturing goods and service outputs,
respectively. Following Copeland and Taylor (2003b), we assume that the output
production in the manufacturing sector (x) generates emissions (e) as the production’s
joint output.14 Following Copeland and Taylor (2003b), we assume that firms have
access to pollution abatement technology and spend a fraction (θ) of its output on
the abatement process. Hence, the net output of manufacturing goods is (1 − θ)x,
where θ is the fraction of gross output x used for the emissions abatement.
The structure of abatement technology in our model allows the firms to choose
zero abatement if there is no emissions regulation or if the abatement is not cost
effective. As in Copeland and Taylor (2003b), we use a specific abatement technology
that models emissions as e = (1 − θ) 1ξx, where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 is the fraction of gross
output (x) firms spend on abatement and (0 > ξ > 1) such that e ≤ x. Here,
ξ is the share of emissions expenditure in the net output of manufacturing goods.
As ξ increases, abatement becomes less effective and more gross output is required
to reduce emissions by the same amount. A non-zero level of emissions tax (T ) is
assumed to always exist in the economy, and the tax level is higher than ξ.15
The representative firm in each sector maximizes the following profit functions:
max
hx,e
pix = e
ξ(hα1x )
1−ξ − whx − Te (2.6)
13The labor factor can also be interpreted as a composite of capital and labor, or any arbitrary
non-pollution inputs.
14This approach has been used in a series of influential general equilibrium trade and environment
studies, including those of Copeland (1994) and Antweiler et al. (2001).
15We require this assumption since for any emissions tax level below ξ firms do not find it cost
effective to abate emissions and, thus, choose to pay the tax. This abatement technology does not
admit emissions taxes of 0. See Copeland and Taylor (2003b) for a full description.
43
max
hy
piy = p µ h
α2
y − why (2.7)
The optimal conditions are
α1(1− ξ)
( e
x
)ξ x
hx
= pµα2
y
hy
(2.8)
ξ
(x
e
)1−ξ
= T (2.9)
Firms employ labor (Eq. (2.8)) such that the marginal return to labor is equal across
the two sectors.16 Eq. (2.9) shows that firms optimally abate such that the marginal
cost of abatement of emissions is equal to the per-unit emissions tax.
Plugging the firm’s zero profit conditions into the budget constraint Eq. (2.2),
the economy’s resource constraint is thus
eξ(hα1x )
1−ξ − cx + p µ (hα2y − cy) = R¯d¯ (2.10)
The trade balance is then equal to the interest payments on the debt,17 The transfer
from the government to households is
G = T e (2.11)
The trade flows in the manufacturing and service sectors are
bx = e
ξ(hα1x )
1−ξ − cx (2.12)
by = p µ (h
α2
y − cy) (2.13)
where bx and by are the trade flows in the economy’s manufacturing and service
sectors.
16Labor is mobile across sectors, but not across countries.
17thus allowing the country to run consistent trade deficits or surpluses in aggregate across the
two industries.
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In our model the emissions level in the rest of the world is not explicit since
the model does not have an explicit production function of the rest of the world. We
assume that a unilateral increase in pollution taxes would not alter the environmental
regulation in the rest of the world. The rest of the world’s consumption is not affected
by a change in the level of domestic emissions tax since the world’s relative price is
fixed. The level of outputs in each sector in the rest of the world would vary depending
on the changes in the trade flows in the corresponding sectors.18 Hence, we define the
change in trade flows in the manufacturing sector bx as the “leakage” of emissions.
19
For an economy that imports manufacturing goods, an increase in imports suggests
an increase in the rest of the world’s emissions and thus leakage.20
2.3 Analytical Solution
In this section, we analytically solve the model through log-linearization. Taking logs
of the first order equations and totally differentiating, the change in each variable is
represented by a proportional change from its initial level (which we denote with (ˆ)
). For example, a small change in x is indicated by xˆ = dx
x
.
On the supply side, taking logs on both sides of Eq. (2.8) and totally differentiating
yields
ξeˆ+ (1− ξ)xˆ− hˆx = yˆ − hˆy (2.14)
Taking logs on both sides of Eq. (2.9) and totally differentiating yields
eˆ = xˆ− 1
1− ξ Tˆ (2.15)
18The rest of the world is large compared to the small economy, thus implying that the change in
the trade flows reflects the change in the emissions level in the rest of the world with respect to the
emission level in the small economy.
19Alternatively, the emissions intensity in the rest of the world is assumed to be fixed, and the
supply of manufacturing goods responds one-to-one to changes in domestic trade flows.
20If an economy exports manufacturing goods, then a reduction in exports implies leakage.
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Log-linearization of the production functions yields
xˆ = α1hˆx (2.16)
yˆ = α2hˆy (2.17)
Also, from hx + hy = h¯, we have
θhxhˆx + θhyhˆy = 0 (2.18)
where θhx and θhy are the shares of labor in manufacturing and service sectors,
respectively (hence, θhx + θhy = 1).
On the demand side, taking logs and totally differentiating both sides of Eq. (2.5)
yield
cˆx = cˆy (2.19)
The relative price ratio and trade friction are fixed. A percentage change in the
demand for manufacturing goods must be equal to the percentage change in the
demand of services. Unless there are changes in the relative price, the relative demand
of each good will not change.
Totally differentiating the resource constraint in equilibrium (Eq. (2.10)) yields
cxcˆx + p µ cy cˆy = e
ξx1−ξ[ξeˆ+ (1− ξ)xˆ] + p µ y yˆ (2.20)
We have a system of seven equations: optimal labor Eq. (2.14); optimal emissions
Eq. (2.15); two production functions, Eq. (2.16) and Eq. (2.17); labor constraint Eq.
(2.18); optimal relative consumption Eq. (2.19); and resource constraint Eq. (2.20).
The system has seven unknowns: labor supply in the two sectors, hˆx and hˆy; outputs
in the two sectors, xˆ and yˆ; emissions eˆ; and consumption of the two goods, cˆx and
cˆy. First, we solve for the change in amount of labor used in services hˆy
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hˆy =
θhx
θhx(1− α2) + θhy(1− α1)
ξ
1− ξ Tˆ ; (2.21)
and then, plugging hˆy, we solve for hˆx, yˆ, xˆ, and eˆ (See appendix). Substituting these
solutions in Eq. (2.20) and simplifying, the change in consumption expenditure on
manufacturing goods (cˆx) is then
cˆx =
[
α2Syθhx − α1Sxθhy
θhx(1− α2) + θhy(1− α1) − Sx
]
ξ
1− ξ Tˆ ; (2.22)
where, letting C = cx + p µ cy be the aggregate consumption, Sx =
eξx1−ξ
C
and
Sy =
p µ y
C
represent the shares of manufacturing goods and services in the aggregate
consumption, respectively.
As shown in Eq. 2.22, a small increase in the emissions tax (Tˆ ) has two effects on
consumption of manufacturing goods: an income effect and a terms of trade effect.
The first term inside the bracket
[
α2Syθhx−α1Sxθhy
θhx(1−α2)+θhy(1−α1)
]
is the income effect; and the
second term [Sx] is the price effect, which we refer to as the terms of trade effect.
21
The third term outside the bracket is a scale factor
[
ξ
1−ξ
]
, the ratio of emission
expenditure to potential output in the manufacturing sector, which we term as the
abatement resource factor. This factor augments the income and terms-of-trade
effects such that higher ξ increases the emissions tax’s net effect on consumption
as abatement becomes less effective. This factor’s impact differs from other studies
that have found an abatement resource effect leading to negative leakage. In those
studies, the taxed sector substitutes clean resources shrinking output in other sectors,
leading to negative leakage.22
21These terms can also be rearranged such that cˆx =[
α2Syθhx
θhx(1−α2)+θhy(1−α1) − Sx
(
α1Sxθhy
θhx(1−α2)+θhy(1−α1) + 1
)]
ξ
1−ξ Tˆ . In this case, the first term should be
interpreted as the indirect effect and the second term as the direct effect of the emissions tax on
consumption.
22Our model has only a single (clean) input and thus no scope for factor substitution. Polluting
firms endogenously abates emissions by reducing output.
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From Eq. (2.19) and (2.22), we note that a small increase in the emissions tax in
a small open economy also has similar negative effects on consumption of services.
Proposition 1. A small increase in the emissions tax in a small open economy has a
negative effect on consumption of manufacturing goods because of the negative impact
of both the income and the terms-of-trade effects.
Proof : See appendix.
After an increased producer price in the manufacturing sector because of an increased
emissions tax, income is affected through two channnels. First, the effective
price of consumption is increased; thus, consumption of both goods and services
decreases. Secondly, labor is reallocated to the service sector, reducing the real
wage. This reduction reduces the real income available to consumers; and, as a
result, consumption of manufacturing goods decreases. This effect is particularly
important when we consider negative leakage. The more negative the income effect,
the larger the increase in manufacturing goods’ exports and thus the larger the leakage
decreases.23
Corollary 1.1. A small increase in emissions tax in a small open economy has a
negative effect on consumption of services. The decline in consumption of services
and manufacturing are proportional.
Evident from Eq. (2.19), it implies that the emissions tax increase has negative
effects on consumption of services, similar to the consumption of manufacturing goods.
Net imports are equal to consumption minus production in our model, cx −
eξx1−ξ. We define leakage as the rate of change in net imports and define it as Lˆ
where L = cx − eξx1−ξ. Hence, total differentiating L and plugging solutions for
23This finding is consistent with Baylis et al. (2015) who identify a “pure income effect” that
reduces leakage. The pure income effect in that study arises from the assumption that tax revenue
is spent on a public good rather than rebated.
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change in consumption of manufacturing goods cˆx, emissions eˆ, and outputs in the
manufacturing sector xˆ with rearrangement yields the leakage
Lˆ =
[
Scx
Smx
(
α2Syθhx − α1Sxθhy
θhx(1− α2) + θhy(1− α1)
)
+
Sx
Smx
(
α1θhy
θhx(1− α2) + θhy(1− α1)
)
+
(
Sx
Smx
− SxScx
Smx
)]
ξ
1− ξ Tˆ
(2.23)
where, Smx =
bx
C
and Scx =
cx
C
are the shares of manufacturing goods’ exports and
consumption in the aggregate consumption, respectively. Note that bx is the trade
flows in the manufacturing sector. Scy =
cy
C
is the share of services’ consumption in
the aggregate consumption.
Proposition 2. A small increase in an emissions tax in a small open economy has
three leakage effects: income, output and terms of trade. The income effect is negative,
and both output and terms of trade effects are positive. The net effect on leakage is
positive.
Proof :
As shown in Eq. (2.23), the first term
[
Scx
Smx
(
α2Syθhx−α1Sxθhy
θhx(1−α2)+θhy(1−α1)
)
< 0
]
is the income
effect. As noted in Proposition 1, this effect is negative, which increases exports of
manufacturing goods and reduces leakage.
The second term
[
Sx
Smx
(
α1θhy
θhx(1−α2)+θhy(1−α1)
)
> 0
]
is the output effect, which is
positive. Outputs in the manufacturing sector decline because of increased input
prices resulting from the emissions tax policy (See Eq. (2.16)). These increased
prices decrease exports of manufacturing goods and lead to a positive leakage effect.
The third term on the right
[
Sx
Smx
− SxScx
Smx
]
is the terms-of-trade effect, which has
two components: effects on (1) consumption and (2) output of manufacturing goods
because of the goods’ increased relative price. The increased emissions tax increases
the producer’s price and worsens terms of trade in the manufacturing sector, thus
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decreasing the exports of manufacturing goods. As a result, a positive leakage effect
which is shown by Sx
Smx
. As mentioned earlier, the increase in the producer’s price
also negatively affects consumption of goods, as households substitute goods with
services. The substitution in consumption reduces leakage. This effect is shown by
−SxScx
Smx
. However, the output component dominates the consumption component, and
the net effect is positive
[
SxScy
Smx
]
.
The scale factor
[
ξ
1−ξ > 0
]
has the same effect as in Eq. (2.22). This factor
describes how effective an environmental policy is at affecting the net emissions
leakage. Furthermore, this factor has an economy-wide resource effect and increases
with an increase in ξ (the share of abatement expenditure in output in the
manufacturing sector). Abatement uses real output resources from the manufacturing
sector. The lower the fraction of the manufacturing sector’s output spent on
abatement, the less effect the emissions tax has on leakage, as fewer resources will be
spent on abatement.
We note that whether the economy imports or exports manufacturing goods, an
increase in emissions tax yields emissions leakage.
2.3.1 Specific Cases
In this section we explore extreme cases of an economy with no trade in services
(section 2.3.1) and costless trade in services (section 2.3.1) to better understand how
the level of trade in the clean good affects leakage. Trade costs’ general effects on
emissions leakage is examined in section 2.3.1.
The case with freely traded goods and services assumes that the world’s relative
price is exogenous to the emissions tax change. In the case with no trade in services,
the emissions tax affects the domestic relative price of services. Both of these cases
make extreme assumptions about tradability of goods and services. However, the
emissions tax change’s impact on the relative price is an empirical question. Hoel
(1996) argues that the relative price’s immunity to the emissions tax change is not
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practical. On the other hand, Baylis et al. (2014) find a causal relationship between
the change in the relative price and the negative leakage because of the abatement
resource effect (ARE) present in their model. In our model, the case with no trade
in services highlights the importance of change in relative prices by showing that
emissions leakage is zero when relative prices do not adjust. The case with free trade
in goods and services also highlights the relative importance of the channels through
which an emissions tax change affects leakage.
No Trade in Services
We begin by considering an extreme case of an economy with no trade in services. In
our model, no trade in services means zero trade balance in the service sector, which
requires the following market clearing constraint
y = cy (2.24)
Then, the economy’s trade balance is just the trade flows in the manufacturing sector.
Manufacturing goods are exported; and the receipts are used to service international
debt, balancing the capital and current accounts.24
Proposition 3. In the two-sector small open economy with goods and services, if
services are completely non-traded then a small increase in the emissions tax on
pollution from the manufacturing sector leads to zero emissions leakage. The reduction
in relative price of services proportionally decreases consumption and outputs of
manufacturing goods, thus leading to zero emissions leakage.
Proof :
Substituting Eq. (2.24) in the resource constraint Eq. (2.10), the economy’s trade
balance (which is also the manufacturing goods’ export level) is
eξx1−ξ − cx = R¯d¯ (2.25)
24In this way the economy can run a persistent trade surplus in the steady state.
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Taking the log and total differentiating of both sides yields
sx[ξeˆ+ (1− ξ)xˆ]− cˆx = 0 (2.26)
where sx =
eξx1−ξ
cx
is the share of output to consumption of goods in the manufacturing
sector.
Since, in this case, the world relative price (p) is fixed and services are non-
traded, the effective domestic relative price of services declines with an increased
emissions tax. As a result of the decline, manufacturing goods’ consumption declines
in proportion with the decline in the manufacturing sector’s output. In aggregate, the
export level of manufacturing goods remains the same. The adjustment in the relative
price of services affects both consumption and output proportionately, preventing
emissions leakage.
The producer price increases in the manufacturing sector after an increase in the
emissions tax. As a result, the effective relative price in the service sector decreases,
and the relative demand for services increases. On the production side, labor is
reallocated to the service sector. As a result, output in the service sector increases
while output in the manufacturing sector declines. Hence, in this case, the increased
emissions tax affects consumption and production in the service sector in the same
direction, driven by the reduced domestic effective relative price in services. Also,
the effects on consumption and production in the manufacturing goods’ sector are
balanced. As a result, this case yields zero emissions leakage.
Zero Trade Costs
We now turn to the other extreme case, an economy with zero trade costs in polluting
manufacturing goods or clean services. Free trade in services (µ = 1) ties domestic
prices to world prices and re-introduces emissions leakage from the environmental
policy. Total differentiation of the resource constraint in the long-run equilibrium
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(Eq. (2.10)) yields
cxcˆx + p cy cˆy = e
ξx1−ξ[ξeˆ+ (1− ξ)xˆ] + p y yˆ (2.27)
We have the system of seven equations: (Eq. (2.14), (2.15), (2.16), (2.17), (2.18),
(2.19) and (2.27), and seven unknowns: hˆx, hˆy, xˆ, yˆ, eˆ, cˆx and cˆy. Again, the system
is first solved for the change in the amount of labor in the service sector hˆy
hˆy =
θhx
θhx(1− α2) + θhy(1− α1)
ξ
1− ξ Tˆ ; (2.28)
and then, plugging hˆy back in, we solve for hˆx, yˆ, xˆ, and eˆ as before. Substituting
these solutions in Eq. (2.27) and simplifying, the consumption expenditure on
manufacturing goods (cˆx) is then
cˆx =
[
α2Syθhx − α1Sxθhy
θhx(1− α2) + θhy(1− α1) − Sx
]
ξ
1− ξ Tˆ ; (2.29)
where, Sx =
eξx1−ξ
C
and Sy =
p y
C
are the shares of manufacturing goods and services’
output level in the aggregate consumption C = cx + p cy, respectively.
As before, letting net imports be the leakage level L = cx − eξx1−ξ totally
differentiating L, plugging cˆx, eˆ and xˆ with rearrangement yields
Lˆfree =
[
Scx
Smx
(
α2Syθhx − α1Sxθhy
θhx(1− α2) + θhy(1− α1)
)
+
Sx
Smx
(
α1θhy
θhx(1− α2) + θhy(1− α1)
)
+
Sx
Smx
Scy
]
ξ
1− ξ Tˆ
(2.30)
where, C = cx + p cy, Sx =
eξx1−ξ
C
, Sy =
p y
C
, Scx =
cx
C
, Scy =
cy
C
and Smx =
bx
C
.
These shares are different from Eq. (2.23) since µ = 1. This case has all three effects
on emissions leakage, as in Lˆ in Eq. (2.23). The income effect is negative, and the
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output and terms-of-trade effects are positive with respect to emissions leakage from
a change in environmental policy. In contrast to the case with no trade in services,
the increased emissions tax affects consumption and production in the service sector
in the opposite direction. However, the effects on consumption and production in the
manufacturing sector are in the same direction. Because of the balance of payments
constraint, the positive surplus in the service sector must balance with a deficit in
the manufacturing sector. Thus, this case yields positive emissions leakage.
Effect of Service Trade Cost on Emissions Leakage
In this section, we explore how emissions leakage varies at different levels of the
service sector’s trade costs. Trade costs in services have generally decreased over
time. Information technology has facilitated trade in services, and countries have
been pressured to roll back services’ trade restrictions (Miroudot and Shepherd, 2014;
Gervais and Jensen, 2014). The special cases above suggest that the level of trade cost
in services is crucial regarding the amount of leakage from changes in environmental
policy. In this section, we show that a fall in trade costs in services affects emissions
leakage.
We differentiate the emissions leakage Lˆ in Eq. (2.23) with respect to the trade
friction (µ) to find the effect of changes in trade costs on emissions leakage from
increased environmental regulation
∂Lˆ
∂µ
=
[
Scx
µ Smx
(
α2SyScxθhx + α1SxScyθhy
θhx(1− α2) + θhy(1− α1)
)
+
(
SxScy
µ Smx
)]
ξ
1− ξ Tˆ
(2.31)
where the first term, Scx
µ Smx
(
α2SyScxθhx+α1SxScyθhy
θhx(1−α2)+θhy(1−α1)
)
> 0, is the change in the income
effect as the service sector’s trades increase. This effect suggests that the negative
income effect from an increase in the level of environmental regulation is dampened
in countries with high service-sector trade costs. The second term,
(
SxScy
µ Smx
)
> 0, is
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the change in the terms-of-trade effect on emissions leakage, which is also positive.
This effect suggests that the positive terms-of-trade effect from an increased level
of environmental regulation on leakage is amplified by higher service sector trade
costs. The fact that both effects are positive suggests increased level of environmental
regulation has larger leakage effects in countries with high trade costs.
To explore this result’s implications, we consider two countries, which are both
service importers. One country has relatively high service-sector trade costs and the
other relatively low. Both countries increase the level of environmental regulation by
the same amount. Equation 2.23 shows that our model predicts leakage will increase
in both countries. Equation 2.31 indicates that leakage will increase more in the
country with high service sector trade costs.
In both countries the income effect on leakage from the increased environmental
tax will be negative. Consumers will consume less of both goods and services after
the environmental tax increase. This consumption decrease will lead to excess supply
in the home country and more manufacturing exports, reducing the rest of the
world’s production and, thus, the rest of the world’s emissions.25 Equation 2.31
reveals that this effect will be dampened in the country with high trade cost. The
relatively high price of services in the high trade cost country means that the loss
in consumption associated with increased environmental tax will be smaller. The
smaller the reduction in consumption, the lower the negative leakage associated with
an increased environmental tax.
In both countries the terms-of-trade effect will be positive. An increased
environmental tax will make the (imported) manufacturing good more expensive, thus
leading to reduced manufacturing consumption, increased manufacturing production
in the rest of the world, and increased pollution emissions. The country whose
service sector’s trade cost is high will find it relatively more expensive to substitute
25Also, a “pure income effect” results in which labor reallocation across sectors reduces wages and
consumption.
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manufactured goods with services after the price change. This will magnify the
positive leakage effect in the country with high service sector trade costs.
In our model the service sector’s trade costs have no impact on output, holding
income, and terms-of-trade constant. Therefore, there is no difference in the output
effect across the low and high service sector trade cost countries. The trade cost’s
reduction decreases only the nominal wage in both sectors, while the real wage remains
the same. The nominal wage falls in proportion to the trade cost because price is
defined relative to manufacturing goods’ output price in our model. In other words,
the domestic prices of services and manufacturing goods fall by the same proportion
as the trade cost, for increased emissions tax. That means that the labor allocation
will not change, and output in both sectors is constant.26
After rearranging Eq. (2.31), the equation can be rewritten as
∂Lˆ
∂µ
=
Scx
µ
Lˆ > 0 (2.32)
where, Scx =
cx
cx+pµcy
. This leads to proposition 4.
Proposition 4. Services’ trade costs amplify emissions leakage. For service
importers, increased environmental regulation is associated with more leakage when
services’ trade costs are high. If services are exported, a fall in trade costs in services
increases the emissions leakage.
The emissions leakage from a constant change in the level of emissions tax is
affected by changes in consumption as a result of the income and terms-of-trade
effects. For a fall in the trade costs in services, the sign of change in µ is negative
when services are imported and positive when they are exported. Thus, the fall in
trade costs in services decreases the income and terms-of-trade effects on emission
leakage if services are imported and increases the income and terms-of-trade effects
26Also, differentiating manufacturing goods’ output xˆ and eˆ (see appendix) with respect to µ
shows no effect on these variables’ changes. As expected, the change in output and, thus, the change
in domestic emissions for a constant level of emissions tax should not change with µ.
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on the emissions leakage if services are exported. The output effect, however, does
not change with the trade friction’s sign. Hence, if services are imported, the fall in
trade cost in services has a negative effect on the emissions leakage; and if services
are exported, a positive effect on emissions leakage results.
Corollary 4.1. The marginal effect of a fall in trade cost in services on the emissions
leakage is larger for a higher share of manufacturing goods in aggregate consumption,
smaller µ, and higher emissions leakage from the emissions tax policy.
The trade costs’ marginal effect on emissions leakage depends on the existing
trade costs’ magnitude, the manufacturing goods’ consumption share in aggregate
consumption, and the magnitude of the emissions leakage itself. Evident from Eq.
(2.32), the emissions leakage is affected by falling trade cost through income and
terms-of-trade effects on the manufacturing goods’ consumption. When services are
imported, the relative price of domestic services decreases as services’ trade costs
fall, leading to decreased consumption of manufacturing goods at the margin. This
decrease in manufacturing goods’ consumption increases exports, if all else is equal,
and thus reduces the terms-of- trade effect on emissions leakage. The larger the
share of manufacturing goods’ consumption in aggregate consumption, the larger the
terms-of-trade effect on emissions leakage.
A fall in trade costs in services also increases households’ real income, leading
to increased manufacturing goods’ consumption, thus reducing the income effect on
emissions leakage. The marginal effect on the emissions leakage because of the income
effect is higher if the initial µ is smaller, implying a bigger effective relative change
in µ compared to its initial level.
2.4 Numerical Analysis
In the analytical solution, the effects on leakage depend on the initial equilibrium
condition and the economy’s deep structural parameters. Furthermore, in the
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analytical solution, the relative sizes of these effects are indistinguishable. In
this section, we numerically estimate these effects by calibrating our model to
macroeconomic data from Canada.
2.4.1 Data Aggregation and Calibration
We use long-run empirical relationships to identify our model’s deep structural
parameters. The model is calibrated such that the calibrated economy’s structure
can simulate the long-run equilibrium that matches the Canadian economy’s historical
annual data. The data on the historical annual expenditure-based GDP of Canada
during 1981-2010 is available from Statistics Canada.27 To be consistent with our
model specification, GDP is imputed by netting out government expenditure and
gross fixed-capital formations. The durable, semi-durable, and non-durable goods in
the data are aggregated as manufacturing goods.28
During the period, manufacturing goods account for 53.1% of GDP and services
account for the remaining 46.9%. Of the manufacturing goods 18.9% are exported
(equivalent to 10.11% of GDP), and 2.2% of services are imported (equivalent to 1.0%
of total GDP). Consumption of goods accounts for 43.3% of GDP while consumption
of services accounts for 48.3%. The imputed debt-to-output ratio is 2.11.29 We set
d¯ = 3.195 and the total output in our model corresponds to Canadian $ 668 billion,
the average Canadian GDP during 1981-2010.
The parameter values used to calibrate the model’s steady state to the Canadian
economy are shown in Table 2.1. The share of consumption goods in the utility
function (γ) is estimated by rearranging Eq. (2.5) and using the observed average
consumption of goods and services. The average employee compensation in the
Canadian economy’s manufacturing and service sectors is 21% and 37% of gross
27Source: Statistics Canada. Table 380-0106 Gross domestic product.
28The definitions of durable and non-durable goods and services are in accordance with Statistic
Canada’s description. The services include transportation and storage, communication, finance,
insurance, real estate, professional, educational, accommodation, and wholesale.
29The ratio is higher than the observed debt-to-GDP ratio because of the imputed GDP.
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outputs respectively.30 Labor share of manufacturing’s and services’ output is 0.21
and 0.37, respectively. The share of abatement expenditure in the manufacturing
sector’s output is assumed to be 9%, which is the level Fischer and Springborn (2011)
used for the United States.31 The exogenous international real interest rate is 4% per
annum.
The services’ trade cost is available from Anderson et al. (2013). The authors’
estimate for the sample period (1997-2007) shows that the Canadian border is 1.63
tariff equivalent with the rest of the world .32 The Canadian border’s effect on services
in the rest of the world ranges from the tariff equivalent of 23% in accommodations
to 163% in wholesale services to 63% in aggregate services. Thus, we set the services’
trade cost at 0.63 with µ(= 1 + trade cost) as 1.63 in our model.
The world relative price of services (p) in terms of manufacturing goods is
calibrated to match the empirical trade-flow shares of manufacturing goods and
services to the imputed GDP. The export share of goods to the GDP in the calibrated
economy is 10.11%, and the import share of services to GDP is 1.03%.
2.4.2 Results
We first solve the system of equations for the equilibrium with an exogenously fixed
emissions tax. This emissions tax is arbitrarily set at 0.1, which is equivalent to
10% of the world price of manufacturing goods in our model. Then, we estimate the
share of consumption, output, and both goods’ and services’ share of trade flows in
aggregate consumption. These shares are then used to estimate the income, terms-of-
trade, and output effects on emissions leakage. The sum of these effects is the total
30These shares are estimated over our sample period. Source: Statistics Canada. Table 383-0032
- Multifactor productivity, gross output, value-added, capital, labor, and intermediate inputs at a
detailed industry level, by North American Industry Classification System (NAICS)
31Our estimate from the Canadian abatement expenditure data shows that the share is 7.5%,
but data are only available for few irregular periods. Therefore, we follow Fischer and Springborn
(2011). Using 7.5% does not materially affect the results.
32The estimate assumes that the elasticity of substitution is 6 across the following services
in Canada: transportation, communication, wholesale, finance, business, education, health,
accommodation, among others.
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Table 2.1: Parameters in the Calibrated Economy
Parameter Description Value
Deep structural parameters
R¯ Real interest rate 0.04
ξ Share of abatement in output of goods 0.09
h¯ Household’s endowment of labor 1
γ Share of goods in consumption 0.57
α1 Labor share in goods 0.21
α2 Labor share in services 0.37
µ Trade friction(1 + trade cost) 1.63
Calibrated parameters
σ Intertemporal elasticity (risk parameter) 2
ρ Elasticity of substitution between goods and services 2.2
p World relative price of services in terms of goods 0.51
d¯ Debt-level 3.195
effect of an increased environmental regulation on emissions leakage, which can also
be treated as the “leakage multiplier” for a unit-percentage increase in the emissions
tax. The leakage multiplier is a useful way to summarize the total emissions leakage
resulting from the emissions tax change. Then the leakage multiplier is used to obtain
the total emissions leakage for a unit-percentage emissions reduction.
Table 2.2 shows the calibrated trade-flow shares of goods and services to aggregate
output. Also the shares of consumption of goods and services to the aggregate output
in the Canadian economy are shown in the table. The economy’s initial steady state
is provided in Table 2.3.
The estimates for the three channels through which an increased pollution tax
affects emissions leakage (income, output, and terms of trade) are provided in Table
2.4. The results indicate that the income effect is negative and small, while the output
and terms-of-trade effects are positive and much larger. For these parameter values,
the terms-of-trade effect comprises just over three-quarters of the total leakage from
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Table 2.2: Empirical and Calibrated Data
Description
Empirical Data
(1981-2010)
Calibrated
Economy
Share of traded goods in GDP 10.11% 9.52%
Share of traded services in GDP -1.03% -1.08%
Share of consumption of goods in GDP 43.34% 43.56%
Share of consumption of services in GDP 48.26% 47.49%
Table 2.3: Initial Steady State in the Calibrated Economy
Variable Value
Aggregate output(Y ) 1.515
Output of goods(x) 0.804
Output of services(pµy) 0.702
Consumption of goods(cx) 0.660
Consumption of services(pµcy) 0.719
Labor in goods(hx) 0.372
Labor in services(hy) 0.628
Trade flows of goods(bx) 0.144
Trade flows of services(by) -0.016
Emissions(e) 0.0724
Emissions tax(T ) 0.1
increased environmental regulation. The terms-of-trade effect accounts for the largest
share of emissions leakage followed by the output effect. These effects dominate the
income effect. As a result, the emissions leakage is positive.
We estimate that a 1% increase in the emissions tax in Canada will reduce domestic
emissions by 1.12%. This reduction in Canadian emissions is associated with a 0.384%
increase in the rest of the world’s emissions. That generates leakage of 34.3%, meaning
for every ton Canadians reduce their CO2 emissions, the rest of the world’s emissions
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increase by 0.343 tons and global emissions fall by 0.657 tons.33 This emissions
leakage estimate is comparable to estimates from similar policy counterfactuals for
developed countries discussed in the existing literature. We are unaware of any policy
experiment’s estimates for Canada comparable to those presented here. Felder and
Rutherford (1993) use a similar approach to estimate a policy counterfactual for
OECD countries and finds 45% emissions leakage. More recently, Elliott et al. (2010b)
estimates 40% emissions leakage for the United States.34
Table 2.4: Effects on the Emission Leakage Under Unit % Emissions Reduction
Income Output
Terms of
Trade
Total
Leakage
Leakage -0.004 0.089 0.257 0.343
(-1%) (26%) (75%)
Note: The top row represents the effects on leakage, decomposed by channels for a 1% reduction
in domestic emissions. The second row (in parentheses) shows each effect’s share in the emissions
leakage. The last column represents the total emissions leakage, which is the sum of the effects
identified in our model. Emissions leakage is linear for small changes in the emission tax. The
domestic emissions’ reduction units are percentages of baseline Canadian emissions, and the
emissions leakage units are a percentage of the unit % reduction in the domestic emissions. Therefore,
0.343 positive leakage implies that the rest of the world’s emissions will increase by 0.343% if Canada
reduces 1% of its emissions compared to its pre-policy change in emissions level.
Table 2.5 shows the differences in the estimates of emissions leakage, as a
proportion of domestic emissions’ reduction, for 1% reduction in domestic emissions
under the three assumptions on the level of tradability in services: no trade in services,
non-zero trade costs, and freely traded services. For non-traded services, the emissions
leakage is zero. In our model with 63% trade cost in services, the total leakage is
34.3%. For zero trade cost in services, we estimate 27.9% emissions leakage. Zero
trade cost in services lowers the emissions leakage by over 18%. Hence, the results
33This discussion assumes our small economy’s emissions intensity is equal to the rest of the
world’s. If they differed, evaluating global (net) emissions reduction would require scaling the leakage
by the difference in relative emissions intensity.
34Many CGE models estimate leakage, but tend to focus on leakage estimates’ sensitivity
to parameter choices or specific policies like the Kyoto Protocol rather than emissions policy’s
counterfactual analysis.
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suggest that for Canada the emissions leakage from a stricter environmental regulation
is positive, but a fall in the service sector’s trade cost may lower emissions leakage.
Table 2.5: Effects of Trade Cost on the Emissions Leakage Under 1% Emissions Reduction
Cases µ Emissions Leakage
Non-traded services ∞ 0
Trade cost in services with 1.63 34.3%
Zero trade cost in services 1 27.9%
Note: Each row represents the emissions leakage from a 1% reduction in domestic emissions at
different trade cost levels in services. The emissions leakage is the change in the rest of the world’s
emissions in % of domestic emissions reduction. The top row represents the emissions leakage when
services are completely non-traded. The second row represents the emissions leakage under the
services’ level of trade cost estimated from the literature. The third row represents the emissions
leakage when the services’ trade cost is zero.
2.5 Conclusion
In this study, we build an analytical general equilibrium model of a small open
economy in which we include both freely traded polluting manufacturing goods and
potential non-polluting services’ trade costs. We decompose a small increase in
pollution taxes’ effects on emissions, known as emissions leakage, in the rest of the
world. We extend the extensive literature on leakage from unilateral environmental
regulation to show that the degree of tradability in non-polluting sectors greatly
affects the amount of leakage. We also investigate the channels through which changes
in environmental regulation affect emissions leakage.
When services are completely non-traded, we find that increases in environmental
regulation lead to zero emissions leakage. The non-traded service sector’s relative
price will adjust to the new equilibrium. The global price of the polluting good, and
thus global production and pollution emissions, will remain unchanged. The current
literature typically assumes that services are freely traded and thus could misattribute
leakage associated with services’ trade costs.
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In our model a stricter environmental policy leads to leakage through three
channels: income, output, and terms-of-trade effects. The income effect negatively
affects emissions leakage (i.e., increases in domestic pollution taxes reduce the rest
of the world’s emissions). The output and terms-of-trade effects lead to positive
emissions leakage. Based on a model calibrated to the Canadian economy, our results
suggest that the output and terms-of-trade effects dominate the income effect; thus,
there is positive net emissions leakage. Our results suggest that with a stricter
emissions tax, a 1% reduction in domestic emissions yields an emissions leakage of
34.3%, reducing global emissions by 0.66 ton for each ton of domestic reduction.
Furthermore, we find over 18% lower emissions leakage if services’ trade costs fall
from the level estimated in the literature (63%) to zero.
In this study, we employ a small open-economy framework to simplify our model
and derive analytical results for the three channels of leakage. The small economy
assumption means that some channels (for example, fuel-price effect) identified
elsewhere in the literature through which leakage can occur are not present in our
model. Future work should address whether -and if, how -the assumption of no, or
constant, trade costs in services affect estimated emissions leakage in large-scale CGE
models.
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Chapter 3
Output Multipliers and State
Rainy Day Funds
3.1 Introduction
In the early 1980s during the recession, states were under pressure to reduce spending
and raise taxes because of falling revenues. These responses led to several states
establishing formal budget stabilization funds popularly known in the U.S. as “rainy
day funds” (RDFs). The funds were seen as a mechanism to smooth taxes and
spending to alleviate fiscal stress during the recession. Nearly all the states in the
U.S. have adopted these funds. However, little empirical evidence exists regarding
the impact of RDFs on state economies.
While the intent of RDFs is to smooth taxes and expenditures, the states’
uncoordinated behavior may impart a fiscal externality on the macroeconomy that
helps smooth the business cycle. While specific rules vary by state and have evolved
over time, fund accumulation removes purchasing power from the economy during
periods of economic expansion and injects stimulus into the economy when funds
are disbursed during periods of economic stress. The states’ collective behavior may
yield measurably important impacts for macroeconomic performance. Understanding
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the magnitude of these impacts is important for central government policymakers in
designing and implementing countercyclical policies.
Fiscal policy’s impact on output is of longstanding interest and has been
extensively studied in the literature, though little research has examined state-
government policy’s role. To estimate output multipliers, recent literature has
explored fiscal stimulus through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA) (Feyrer and Sacerdote, 2011; Wilson, 2012) and through federal military
spending (Barro and Redlick, 2011; Ramey, 2011). Some researchers have used
innovative forms of exogenous variation to identify the output multiplier. For
example, Romer and Romer (2010) identify the fiscal multiplier using exogenous
changes in federal taxes and Shoag (2013) uses variation in state pension spending.
Sheremirov and Spirovska (2015) find that the government expenditure’s output
multiplier would be large if government expenditure is debt financed or even larger
than one if monetary policy is accommodative. Recently, Nakamura and Steinsson
(2014) identify the open-economy multiplier using state-level variation in U.S. military
spending. The authors find a small output multiplier, which is larger during recessions
consistent with greater slack in the economy. Clemens and Miran (2012) exploit the
state-level variation in balanced budget rules as an identification strategy. These
studies suggest that government spending has a significant stimulus impact on states’
outputs. Considering funds accumulated in a RDF as a savings account, this may
have consequences on states’ economies. In this study, we provide evidence of such
consequences in the case of RDFs.
RDFs have become an integral part of states’ fiscal institutions and serve as a
formal budget stabilization tool. In contrast to the other forms of policy variation
considered in the literature, RDFs generate policy variation in how states respond
to fiscal stress and potential budget imbalance. The variation in states’ responses
to unexpected deficits or surplus is an alternative mechanism for capturing the fiscal
multiplier. The mechanisms states use to deposit or withdraw from RDFs vary widely.
These mechanisms evolve over time (Bailey et al., 2014; Rose, 2008). Some states use
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state legislative appropriation; in more than half of the states, some percentage of
year-end surplus (for example, such as 5% of the general fund’s balance) is specified to
be deposited into RDFs. Some states use stricter rules involving formulas for deposits
and withdrawals (Bailey et al., 2014; Rose and Smith, 2011; Hou, 2013, 2004).
Several studies examine whether the RDFs’ balances represent real savings (See
Gonzalez and Levinson (2003); Hou (2004); Hou and Duncombe (2008), and Knight
and Levinson (1999)). The issue is whether RDFs simply account for other idle
balances that states might hold. One approach is to compare the differences in the
general fund’s balances with the RDF. Our examination of RDFs takes a different path
by exploring whether fund accumulation and disbursement have measurable effects
on state and national economic performance. If RDFs represent real savings, there
should be statistically significant effects on metrics, such as gross domestic product
(GDP).
The impact of fiscal policy on output and its components has long been a
central part of the literature on fiscal multipliers. Likewise, the central debate in
the public finance literature evaluating RDFs is whether they reduce fiscal stress
during economic downturns. The debate over the RDFs’ ability to reduce fiscal
stress is ongoing. At the same time, no empirical evidence is available on how the
RDF’s provision affects economic performance generally and over the business cycle
particularly. To the extent that a RDF’s disbursement leads to economic stimulus,
an additional mechanism reduces fiscal stress. This is the central question addressed
in this study. We use two separate strands of literature: the macroeconomic fiscal
multiplier literature and the state budget stabilization literature to quantify RDFs’
impact on state output.
Our study also speaks to the important question of fiscal policy coordination
within a monetary union. The federal government and the states have extensive
control over tax and spending instruments. However, the question of fiscal policy
coordination across levels of government in the U.S. has largely been ignored since the
Great Depression. In the years following the depression, Hansen and Perloff coined
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the term “fiscal perversity hypothesis” to explain the states’ procyclical behavior.
It was recognized that the states were required to maintain balanced budgets; in
practice, state fiscal policy may have deepened the depression through tax increases
and spending cuts. More recent federal fiscal stimulus during the Great Recession
was intended to help offset potentially the states’ contractionary budget actions. To
reduce the states’ propensity to reduce spending, hold harmless provisions were put
in place for some spending categories. The states do not use RDFs to affect economic
growth, yet these funds may have this effect. Federal fiscal and monetary authorities
need to know the nature of state RDFs’ countercyclical influences to properly design
and evaluate central government’s actions. We believe our study helps to highlight
the importance of state-level countercyclical fiscal policy in stabilizing the economy.
The key questions addressed in this study are the following:
• What are the impacts of RDFs on state output?
• What is the differential effect of RDFs during expansions and contractions?
• Do RDFs during election years have any impact on state outputs?
To empirically assess these questions, we use a panel of data for 43 U.S. states
for the sample period 1987-2010. We use an Arellano-Bond estimator and control
for the effects of any general fund surplus in our specification. Our findings suggest
that the average output multiplier of RDFs is about 1.5. During recessions, the
multiplier increases to about 3.4. Our assessment shows that RDFs in election years
have impacts on state outputs as big as in recessionary periods. This suggests that
RDFs are used in part for political purposes.
By identifying RDFs’ effects on economic growth, our findings offer strong
evidence that RDFs constitute genuine savings on the part of the states. The growing
role of RDFs in state finances also suggests the need for coordinating monetary
and fiscal policies across federal and state governments. Finally, our results may
be useful to monetary unions such as the EU, whose member countries maintain
budget-stabilization funds in the absence of central government’s fiscal authority.
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In section 3.2, we review relevant literature on RDFs. Section 3.3 briefly explains
the rules governing RDFs and their evolution over time. In section 3.4, we describe
the compilation and source of data used as well as the methods, identification strategy,
model specification, and results. Section 3.5 provides a conclusion.
3.2 Literature Review
The existing literature on budget stabilization funds, known as “rainy day funds”
(RDFs), mainly focuses on three questions: i) Do RDFs affect states’ savings behavior,
meaning do RDFs increase state general fund balance? ii) Does the provision of
budget stabilization funds reduce fiscal stress (i.e., Does a RDF have any role in
smoothing government expenditure over the business cycle?) and iii) What is the
optimal size of budget stabilization funds, for example, are fund sizes adequate to
alleviate fiscal stress? Addressing these questions will help in understanding the
potential role of RDFs as a countercyclical stabilizer.
Effects on State Savings Behavior
Historically, states have long used general fund surpluses (GFSs) as a reserve to
absorb revenue shocks. The GFS may also have countercyclical influences on the
economy. The fund accounts for the general fund’s unreserved and undesignated
balances (UUB) that are usually referred to as the general fund surplus (Hou, 2013).
The GFS is a part of state government’s operating fund; thus, it is designed to operate
within a fiscal year. Unlike the GFS, states establish RDFs as a formal budgeting
tool subject to legislative oversight that prescribes the funding and disbursing process
during boom and bust years. This process is important since RDFs in principle
operate over the long term, including entire economic cycles. In contrast to RDFs,
the GFS is often under contemporaneous spending pressure and is not structured
to provide funding across fiscal years. In the process of identifying the impact of
RDFs, a substitution effect may result across the two funds if one is used in lieu of
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the other; complementarity may arise if both funds are increased simultaneously or
decreased simultaneously. Wagner (2003) and Hou (2004) find strong evidence that
stabilization funds are substitutes for a general fund balance. If two states face a
similar fiscal shock during an economic downturn, one state may use its GFS balance
to offset pressures to increase tax or reduce expenditures while another state might
use a RDF. Our empirical application controls for GFS’s effects when examining the
budget stabilization fund’s impact on state outputs. Since the GFS operates within
a fiscal year, we expect any effect on growth to be modest.
Knight and Levinson (1999) examine the effect of RDFs on state savings’ behavior.
Their finding is that states with RDFs have higher general fund balances compared
to those states without RDFs. States with a higher cap in the RDF and stricter
rules for withdrawing, such as withdrawal only during an economic downturn, lead to
higher balances. The question is whether RDFs represent net savings or are simply a
different way of accounting for idle balances. Importantly, they conclude that RDFs
do represent savings; this finding is important for our work.
Using panel data for the US states for 1974-1997, Wagner (2003) finds that a
general fund’s balance and RDFs’ balances are substitutable to some extent. In
contrast to Knight and Levinson (1999), they find that the RDFs’ role on smoothing
the income shock may be limited since a dollar in a RDF deposit reduces the state
governments’ budget surpluses by about 51 to 56 cents. This finding is important,
and we control for the effects of GFS in our work.
On the other hand, Hou and Duncombe (2008) show that characteristics of the
balanced budget requirements (BBR) and the RDF play a major role in states’
saving behavior. The authors use panel data collected from financial statements with
a sample period (1979-2003), which includes three important recessions and three
business cycles. Their findings suggest that merely appropriating RDFs from the
general fund balance would not increase the total savings as Wagner (2003) also noted.
Importantly, however, the authors suggest that the characteristics of BBR and RDFs
are essential to increasing state savings. For example, RDFs with a higher balance
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cap increases state savings, as Knight and Levinson (1999) also note. Likewise, a
relatively restrictive BBR such as “no deficit carry-over to the next fiscal year” may
increase state savings.
McGranahan (2002) and Zahradnik and Ribeiro (2003) find that RDFs help states’
weather recessions, but these authors remark that an appropriate configuration like
higher caps, flexible rules to use fund during economic downturn, and removal of
replenishment rules could significantly improve RDF’s effectiveness. Gonzalez and
Paqueo (2003) conclude that funds ruled by stringent requirements accumulate higher
balances and reduce social sector expenditure volatility. Knight and Levinson (2000)
and Wagner (2003) find evidence suggesting that states with funds operating under
strict rules save more and receive better bond ratings, making future borrowing less
costly for the state. Importantly, these studies show that rules matter for RDFs’
effectiveness.
In a more recent study, Wagner and Elder (2005) investigate RDFs’ effects on
states’ credit ratings, bond yields, and borrowing costs. Because of RDFs’ ability to
improve states’ ability to cope with economic downturns and to reduce the risk of
default, the funds should decrease the state’s cost of borrowing. The authors find
evidence that the borrowing cost is reduced in states that adopt RDFs with rules for
deposit and withdrawal compared to the states that adopt RDFs without such rules.
The study externally validates that RDFs constitute savings.
To our knowledge, Navin and Navin (1994) study is the only one investigating
the relationship between the RDF’s balance over time and state economic indicators:
gross state products (GSP). However, their analysis is highly descriptive and relies
only on correlation analysis. The authors examine the changes in the RDF’s balance
between 1983 and 1991 to evaluate fiscal health in seven Midwestern states. The
authors use simple correlation coefficients between the RDF’s balance and the
economic indicators’ pre- and post-stabilization period (1983-1991), and they also
use mean and variance analysis. Their results show that the use of RDF varies
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significantly among states; thus, the effectiveness of RDFs also varies among states.
Ability to Reduce Fiscal Volatility
If RDFs can affect fiscal stability, the likelihood increases that they can have a
meaningful impact on the economy. Wagner and Elder (2005) examine how state
expenditure’s volatility is affected by stabilization funds’ size and structure using data
from 1969 to 1999, including the RDF’s entire history of use. Their findings suggest
that, although the “average” state has not witnessed reduced expenditure volatility
by using a RDF, rules governing RDFs matter in reducing such volatility. They find
that states following RDF rules have less volatility in their expenditure than states
that do not have such rules. If governed by stricter deposit and withdrawal rules (i.e.,
requiring deposits or limiting withdrawals), stabilization funds have significant effects
on reducing expenditure volatility.
Douglas and Gaddie (2002) and Sobel and Holcombe (1996) examine the degree
to which RDFs eased “fiscal stress” during 1990-1991 recession. They define fiscal
stress as the sum of discretionary expenditure reductions and tax increases from 1989
to 1992. Their finding suggests that a strict deposit rule eases fiscal stress, providing
evidence that RDFs played a role in smoothing the fiscal cycle in the 1990-1991
recession. Multiple contingency funds along with savings requirements are the key
factors affecting fiscal stress regardless of RDF sizes.
Gonzalez and Paqueo (2003) examine RDFs’ effectiveness in reducing the volatility
of social and nonsocial sector expenditures. They find that RDFs are ineffective
in reducing the volatility of the nonsocial sector’s expenditures but are effective in
reducing the volatility of the social sector’s expenditures. They also find that states
with stringent deposit and withdrawal rules have higher RDF balances and, thus, are
more effective in reducing the volatility of the social sector’s expenditures.
Optimal Design of Budget Stabilization Fund
Over the years as RDFs have been adopted, states have yet to answer the single-most
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important question: What is the RDF’s optimal size? A larger RDF means a larger
opportunity cost in terms of foregone private sector and public sector consumption.
On the other hand, a smaller RDF may not be adequate to cope with fiscal stress
when facing a typical downturn. With this kind of trade-off, a general rule of
thumb of a RDF size of five percent of general fund expenditure emerged as a norm.
However, several studies provide evidence arguing against such a rule. Joyce (2001)
uses a composite volatility index to compare state budget volatility with RDF size.
He argues that the RDF’s size should depend on state budget characteristics that
contribute to state economic volatility and that these characteristics widely vary
among the states. He does not find the rule of thumb fits all states. Also, in a study
specific to Ohio, using historical personal-income data and revenue forecasting, Navin
and Navin (1997) argue that such a rule of thumb is inadequate and suggest a target
of about 13% of the general fund’s expenditure. Zhao (2014) and Mattoon (2003)
suggest that the existing caps on RDFs in several states are not adequate and that
states often do not have sufficient reserves in their RDFs to cope with fiscal stress
during economic downturns.
In a recent study, Tejedo (2012) uses panel data from 1951 to 2000, dropping
the observations after the states adopt a RDF, to investigate the determinants of
choosing a RDF’s configuration after states adopt RDFs. Her main findings are that
the states with higher debt levels may establish weak deposit requirements but stricter
withdrawal rules. Furthermore, fiscal characteristics, such as levels of tax effort or
volatility of state spending, are important factors that determine the choice of a RDF’s
configuration. On a similar note, Wagner and Sobel (2006) also find evidence that
some RDFs were adopted to circumvent existing fiscal constraints, such as tax and
expenditure limits. Rose (2008) examines how states use the funds and finds evidence
of fund manipulation during an election year. She finds that states withdraw as much
as three times more funds in response to deficit shocks occurring in election years than
those in non-election years. In our empirical application, we consider use of a RDF
during an election year.
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3.3 RDF Deposit and Withdrawal Rules
Our initial identification assumptions are that the changes in RDFs are affected by
the variation in rules for deposit and withdrawal over time and that these rules vary
across states but are not correlated to exogenous shocks. Such changes in RDFs are
predetermined as states determine how much to deposit in or withdraw from RDFs
based on how much money they have left at the end of the fiscal year. Our strategy
of using the changes in RDF balance can also be justified by the variation in changes
in RDFs within states, which is much higher than the variation across states. The
states also adjust rules for deposit and withdrawal over time, giving an additional
source of exogenous variation. We describe the deposit and withdrawal rules across
the states in the following subsection. In the appendix, we provide the rules for 48
states in 2002 and 2008, and the changes in the rules are highlighted to show their
evolution over time.
Deposit Rules
States deposit funds in RDFs using four methods: i) discretionary transfer from
general fund surplus based on year-end revenue, ii) legislative appropriation from
the general fund, iii) use of a predetermined formula from the general fund, and iv)
special revenues. Most states cap the amount of deposits, and these caps vary widely
from 5% of the general fund in Idaho to 12% of the general fund in the immediately
preceding fiscal year in Maine. Some states do not have limits for deposits. The
caps increased in several states during 2002-2008, indicating a growing interest in
fiscal stabilization. Several states use stringent deposit rules, such as predetermined
formula. For example, Virginia uses a deposit formula that uses the average revenue
growth over the preceding six years as a trend to deposit automatically into the
RDF 50% of the surplus revenue above the trend (Bailey et al., 2014). Ohio and
Indiana use personal income’s growth rates (Navin and Navin, 1997); Michigan uses
revenue’s annual growth rate (Hou, 2004). In Maine, the deposit has to be at least
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one percent of the general fund revenue. Nearly 21 states determine how much to
deposit based on the surplus at the end of the fiscal year (Bailey et al., 2014). States
like California, Arkansas, Wyoming, and Missouri deposit monies in their RDFs by
legislative approval, leaving the decision to save to the lawmakers’ discretion. States
like Alaska and Louisiana use special revenues, such as oil and gas rents or settlements,
for deposits in their RDFs.
Withdraw Rules
States withdraw monies from their RDFs based on three methods: i) executive
discretion, ii) predetermined formula, and iii) legislative appropriation. A governor’s
declaration of emergency can provide open access to RDFs in states like Florida,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota. These decisions are formalized by
legislative vote. Some states use automatic procedures to withdraw money from the
fund involving formulas, which restrict the procedure to economic conditions rather
than to politicians’ discretion. Such formulas are used in Arizona, Michigan, Indiana
and North Dakota (Hou, 2004). To withdraw funds, several states employ a stringent
method that requires legislative approval. In Illinois, withdrawal from the RDF has
a strict repayment provision, requiring all withdrawals from the fund to be repaid in
full within the fiscal year. Such a restrictive method limits the capacity to provide
fiscal stabilization and limits the impacts on states’ economic growth.
Although it is beyond this study’s scope to describe or model the rules in each
state, it is evident that the states’ methods for deposit and withdrawal may have
different effects on state outputs. The stricter the formulary rules for deposit,
the higher the RDF balance is. On the other hand, the more restrictive it is to
withdraw from the RDF, as with states requiring legislative approval, the higher the
RDF’s balance will be. In contrast, the less restrictive the rules are for deposit (like
appropriating fund transfers) and the less restrictive the rules are to withdraw from
the RDF (like using a formula), the lower the fund’s balance will be. These rules
affecting changes in RDF may in turn have differing impacts on state outputs.
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3.4 Estimating the Rainy Day Fund Output Mul-
tiplier
In this section, we discuss our empirical strategy for estimating state-level RDFs’
output multipliers. We compile annual data on states; Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), budget stabilization funds, and other state-level economic activity for the
American states during 1987-2010. Our measure of output is state-level GDP that
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) constructs. From the U.S. Census
Bureau we obtain state population and unemployment rate data (Table 3.1). We use
GDP deflators based on two time series of chained GDP: 1987-1997 at 1997 US$ and
1998-2010 at 2009 US$, available at BEA. The later series is converted to 1997 US $
to calculate state-level GDP deflators. Table 3.2 summarizes statistics of the data in
level, and Table 3.3 presents the data in one-period changes.
Our dependent variable is the one period ahead of change in state GDP, and the
primary explanatory variable is the one period of change in the RDF balance. We
also have data for an alternative measure of budget stabilization funds: the general
fund surplus (GFS).1 We select the sample period (1987-2010) to exploit rich data
on both the number of states and the use of RDFs. The sample period also includes
three recessions: 1990-1991, 2001, and 2007-2009. By 1990, 39 states had adopted
a formal RDF; and by 2010 all states had adopted a formal RDF except Kansas
and Montana. We drop seven states: Alaska, Washington, Alabama, Arizona, New
Mexico, Montana and Kansas. Alaska is an outlier that has a disproportionate level of
RDF balance compared to other states. The fund’s major source in Alaska is oil rent,
and the fund’s balance is highly affected by oil prices. The data for Washington are
incomplete. Alabama, Arizona, New Mexico and Arkansas are also dropped because
the balances were zero throughout the sample period. Montana and Kansas are
1The data are drawn from Hou (2013). Each series was compiled using various sources including
Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFR). Some states do not report their RDFs in CAFR.
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dropped because of a RDF’s non-existence. Figure 3.1 shows the average of GDP,
RDF and GFS, all on a real per-capita basis during the sample period.
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
R
D
F 
an
d 
G
FS
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
25
00
0
30
00
0
35
00
0
40
00
0
45
00
0
St
at
e 
G
DP
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
fiscal year
Recession Average GDP per capita
Average RDF per capita Average GFS per capita
Figure 3.1: Average Aggregate Real per Capita GDP, RDF and GFS during 1987-
2010
Note: Three time-series variables (state GDP, RDF and GFS) in the above figures are expressed
in annual average real per-capita terms across all states in the sample period of 1987-2010. GDP
is measured at the end of the calendar year. RDF and GFS are balances in the funds at the end of
the fiscal year.
The empirical specification is as follows:
Yi,t+1−Yi,t = β+βF ∗ (Fi,t−Fi,t−1) +βX ∗ (Xi,t−Xi,t−1) + statei + yeart + ei,t (3.1)
where Y is real GDP per capita and F is real RDF balance per capita at the end of the
year ‘t’, X is other variables for controlling their effects (lags of dependent variable as
discussed below) and e is idiosyncratic error term representing macroeconomic shocks.
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Table 3.1: Data and Sources
Variables Sample Period Source
Nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 1987-2010 Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
Rainy day fund balance (RDF) 1987-2010 Hou (2013)
General Fund Surplus (GFS) 1987-2010 Hou (2013)
Existence of Rainy day fund 1987-2008 Hou (2013); Rose and Smith (2011)
Real Gross Domestic Product (1997 US $) 1987-1997 Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
Real Gross Domestic Product (2009 US $) 1998-2010 Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
Population 1987-2010 U.S. Census Bureau
Unemployment Rate 1987-2010 U.S. Census Bureau
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics in Level
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
State GDP 33,453.9 9,706.7 15,468.5 77,393.9
Rainy Day Fund Balance 61.2 175.9 0 2,839.2
General Fund Surplus Balance 57.9 204.5 -714.7 1,322.1
Population 5,978,739.2 6,369,394.3 453,690 37,336,011
Unemployment Rate 5.4 1.8 2.2 13.7
Note: State GDP, Rainy Day Fund and General Surplus Fund are in real per-capita 1997 US$. Population is in
persons. Unemployment rate is in %.
Observations are at state ‘i’ and year ‘t’. state and year are state-specific and year-
specific fixed effects respectively. The key parameter of interest is the coefficient βˆF
that measures the one-period-ahead effect on real GDP per capita for a one-dollar
increase in real RDF balance per capita.
One may suspect that the RDF balance may be endogenous to idiosyncratic shocks
emanating from the economy, monetary policy, or fiscal policy. However, we note that
the savings in RDFs are predetermined and that the change in RDF balance plausibly
may not correlate with the contemporary shocks in the next period. However, the
changes in RDFs may correlate with past shocks since states determine the savings
in RDFs after an economy’s condition is realized. The spending from RDFs may
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics in Changes
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Changes in State GDP 981.3 1,203.5 -11,198.4 11,313.7 989
Changes in Rainy Day Fund 4.0 85.8 -974.2 1,369.0 989
Changes in General Surplus Fund 0.2 99.3 -921.6 920.4 989
Note: All variables in the table are in 1997 US $. State GDP is one period ahead change in real per capita output.
Rainy Day Fund and General Surplus Fund are one period changes in real balance per capita from the last period.
also spill over to other states.2 These funds are specifically designed to receive excess
revenues during good times while withdrawals are restricted for use in bad times. In
some states, for example Virginia, deposits are made based on the average revenue
growth rate over the preceding six years; 50% of the realized surplus revenue above
the trend is automatically deposited in the RDF. If the growth rate of adjusted
personal income in Ohio exceeds 1.4 percent, the excess percentage is multiplied by
the general fund to transfer to the RDF. Several states require legislature approval for
such transfers; such approval takes time. For example, a super majority of votes in
the Iowa legislature is required for withdrawal from the RDF. Rose and Smith (2011)
and Douglas and Gaddie (2002) offer more details on these practices.
We use changes in GFS next period to control the GFS’s effects on output changes
in the next period. The GFS measures revenue surplus over expenditure in a fiscal
year. Hence, the change in GFS is endogenous to the economy’s condition. This
endogeneity clearly shows that OLS estimation of the equation (3.1) is problematic
because of serial correlation and potential endogeneity, causing the estimates to be
biased and inconsistent. Because of legitimate concerns over endogeneity, we employ
the dynamic panel estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This estimator
uses the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator, which takes the equation’s
first difference (3.1) to eliminate the state-specific unobserved effects. Generating
instruments from dependent and independent variables in the model, the estimator
2Our specifications do not control for spending spillovers across states. Following Nakamura and
Steinsson (2014), we refer to these multipliers as open-economy output multipliers.
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is also most appropriate as it is designed for longer panels and short time periods.
To implement the estimator, we modify equation (3.1) as follows:
Yi,t+1 − Yi,t = βF ∗ (Fi,t − Fi,t−1) + βX ∗ (Xi,t −Xi,t−1) + yeart + ei,t (3.2)
where Y is real GDP per capita and F is real RDF balance per capita at the end of
the year ‘t’, X is the dependent variable’s lag and e is an idiosyncratic error term
representing macroeconomic shocks. Observations are at state ‘i’ and year ‘t’. year
are year-specific fixed effects that states face (for example, shocks during recessions
years). This specification assumes that states facing exogenous fiscal shocks respond
through deposits or withdrawals from the RDF and that the changes are uncorrelated
to the idiosyncratic error. However, GDP growth in one year might affect GDP growth
in the subsequent year. To control the lagged effect in the next period, we include
one lag of our dependent variable in the specification. This specification is largely
consistent with the literature on output multipliers, which rarely use covariates other
than the variables of interest in order to avoid endogeneity and multi-collinearity.
Nearly all studies employ an instrument variable for identification purposes. In this
sense, our specification is unique because we use the dependent and independent
variables’ lags to generate instruments while employing the Arellano-bond estimator
as the dynamic panel-data estimator.
3.4.1 Average Output Multiplier of Rainy Day Fund
Table 3.4 and 3.5 summarize our main empirical results. In Table 3.4, we present four
alternative estimates, including models accounting for the potential of endogeneity,
but these models do not satisfy the Sargan specification test. Table 3.5 presents two
additional models that satisfy the Sargan specification test. In Table 3.4, column
(1) treats RDF changes as exogenous while column (2) treats the changes in RDF
as predetermined. Column (3) treats the changes in RDF predetermined while GFS
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changes are endogenous. The last column (4) treats both RDF and GFS changes
as endogenous. The treatment of the variables as exogenous, predetermined, or
endogenous lets the variable’s correct set of lags be employed as instruments in the
estimation. In Table 3.5, column (1) uses the two dummy variables, Unified Republic
Government and Unified Democratic Government, as exogenous covariates and also
instruments. These dummy variables take the value of 1 if the governor is affiliated
with the respective political party and if the political party governs the majority
of the state legislature. For a divided government, the dummy variables take the
value of 0. Additionally, column (2) controls the state-specific income differences.
It is encouraging that, in general, the results are very similar across the models.
The RDF variable’s coefficient is significant across the models, suggesting that the
average output multipliers are in the range of 1.5-1.6. These estimates suggest that
depositing one dollar into the RDF would decrease the next period’s output by just
over $1.50. The RDF variable’s sign is negative as we expect since states on average
deposit money in their RDF (Table 3.3). The coefficient in the changes in GFS is not
statistically significant, but the sign is negative. States on average deposit into the
GFS (Table 3.3), but the changes in GFS are merely transfers of funds to be applied
in the fiscal year. For example, several states use GFS as a source of RDF. Our results
suggest the changes in GFS have on average no statistically significant impact on the
economy. These results may indicate that on average what is generated as a surplus
is returned via tax cuts or is used to support spending.
To put the multipliers into perspective, we expect that the output multiplier for
RDF changes would be similar in size to government spending multipliers that have
been reported in the literature. For example, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012)
report spending multipliers from 1 to 2.12 consisting of the consumption spending
multiplier (1.21) and the defense and nondefense spending multipliers (1.16 and 1.17,
respectively). Likewise, Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) report state government
spending multipliers from 1.4 to 1.6. Our multipliers are in a similar range to these
multiplier estimates.
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Table 3.4: Output Multipliers of Rainy Day Fund
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Changes in RDF -1.550∗∗∗ -1.503∗∗ -1.602∗∗∗ -1.578∗∗∗
(0.465) (0.589) (0.549) (0.548)
Changes in GFS -1.412 -1.430 -1.093 -1.113
(1.509) (1.681) (1.625) (1.661)
N 804 804 804 804
Note: The table reports output multipliers for a $1 increase in RDF.
In all models, the dependent variable is the one period ahead of change
in real per-capita state GDP and employs the Arellano-Bond estimator.
Column (1) reports the estimators when changes in RDF are treated as
exogenous. Column (2) reports the estimation when RDF changes are treated
as predetermined. Column (3) reports the estimators when GFS changes
are treated as endogenous, and RDF changes are treated as predetermined.
Finally, Column (4) reports the estimators when both RDF and GFS changes
are treated as endogenous. To save space, the coefficients for the time-fixed
effects and lagged variables are suppressed. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
3.4.2 Multipliers During High and Low Unemployment Pe-
riods
To determine how big multipliers are during recessions, we investigate the multipliers
during high and low unemployment periods. During periods characterized by
significant labor market slackness in the economy, states are likely to be under
pressure to increase spending that may require drawing funds from RDF. The existing
literature generally notes that the multipliers during a recession should be higher than
during expansionary periods. Our interest is in finding these multipliers’ relative sizes
for the changes in RDFs. Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) use the measure of state-
level unemployment rates as the variable to indicate if the states are undergoing
periods of weak economic growth. We define the high and low economic slack periods
as the periods during which the state-level unemployment rate is higher or lower than
the unemployment rate’s median level in each state across all periods. We follow
Nakamura’s (2014) empirical specification that includes all observations across states
for high and low unemployment rates in the sample period, but the method does not
82
Table 3.5: Output Multipliers of Rainy Day Fund: Additional Exogenous
Instruments
(1) (2)
Changes in RDF -1.573∗∗∗ -1.466∗∗∗
(0.419) (0.398)
Changes in GFS 0.0639 0.265
(0.596) (0.349)
Personal income -0.863∗∗∗
(0.200)
Year 121.6∗∗∗ 780.2∗∗∗
(42.47) (152.2)
Unified Republic Govt -156.4 -123.8
(211.8) (202.3)
Unified Democratic Govt 3.886 -41.98
(112.9) (149.4)
N 579 660
Note: The table reports the two models’ output multipliers that include
additional variables to be used as instruments. In both models, the dependent
variable is the one period ahead of change in real per-capita state GDP and
employs the Arellano-Bond estimator. Column (1) has four lags of dependent
variable as covariates, and column (2) has two lags of dependent variable as
covariates. The coefficients for the time-fixed effects and lagged variables are
suppressed to save space. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
identify the states that might be depositing during high-unemployment periods or
withdrawing during low-unemployment periods. As a result, the coefficients are not
estimated precisely. We also examine the two specifications that include observations
when states withdraw or deposit. We do not find statistically significant results in
either case, suggesting no clear pattern of how states’ RDF withdrawals or deposits
in general affect the outputs.
As an alternative approach, we examine only the states that on average either net
withdraw or deposit funds during the sample period. We run the regression Eq. (3.2)
to get the coefficients in the periods of high and low unemployment. Table 3.6 and
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3.7 summarize the RDF and GFS data for the high and low unemployment periods.
During recessions, on average the states that net withdraw from RDF simultaneously
also deposit in the GFS. In expansionary periods, the deposit in RDFs is much bigger
than the deposit in the GFS.
Table 3.6: High Unemployment Period: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Changes in State GDP 927.8 959.9 -2,553.9 4,062.2 204
Changes in RDF -8.2 52.7 -561.9 113.4 204
Changes in GFS 4.2 101.7 -482.4 644.1 204
Table 3.7: Low Unemployment Period: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Changes in State GDP 1,096.1 1,570.2 -11,198.4 11,313.7 314
Changes in RDF 17.1 140.9 -974.2 1,369.0 314
Changes in GFS 1.3 124.3 -921.6 920.4 314
Table 3.8 summarizes the results. Column (1) reports the coefficients during
periods with high unemployment for states that on net withdraw during the sample
period. Column (2) reports the coefficients for periods of low unemployment for states
that deposit on net during the sample period. The RDFs’ multipliers in the period
of high unemployment are higher than the period of low unemployment. This finding
is consistent with the literature. The results suggest that the multiplier in recessions
(high unemployment) is 3.4 while the multiplier in expansions is 0.6. However, the
estimate for expansions is not statistically significant. This finding suggests that
in recessionary periods the states that on net withdraw $1 on average have output
increased by $3.4 while in expansionary periods the impact is effectively nil. Also,
changes in GFS during the recessionary period is not significant, but those changes are
significant in the expansionary period. This result could reflect accrual of tax revenue
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that is then used to retire debt or is placed in a fund, such as a transportation fund,
for future use.
Table 3.8: Multipliers of Rainy Day Fund: High vs Low Unemployment Period
(1) (2)
High Slackness in Unemployment Low Slackness in Unemployment
Changes in RDF -3.376∗∗ -0.644
(1.711) (0.513)
Changes in GFS 0.985 -2.864∗
(0.686) (1.735)
N 167 304
Note: The table reports output multipliers for a $1 increase in RDF during periods of high and low
unemployment. Both models use the Arellano-Bond estimators. In all models, the dependent variable
is the one period ahead of change in states’ real per-capita GDP. Column (1) reports the estimators for the
high unemployment-rate period for states that on average have net withdrawal from RDF in the sample
period. Column (2) reports the estimators for the expansionary period of states that on average have net
deposits in the sample period. To save space, the coefficients for the time-fixed effects and lagged variables
are not shown in the table. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
3.4.3 Impact of RDFs During Election Years
Rose (2008) is the first to show that states withdraw significant amounts from the
RDF during election years. She shows that nearly three times more funds are
withdrawn from states during a deficit shock in an election year compared to non-
election years. In this section, we investigate the impact of such withdrawals from
RDF in election years compared to non-election years. To do so, we modify our
specification to include an interaction term by multiplying a dummy indicator variable
by our RDF variable. The dummy indicator represents 1 for gubernatorial election
years and 0 for non-gubernatorial election years. Table 3.9 summarizes the results.
Consistent with Rose (2008), the estimated coefficient for changes in the RDF during
election years are nearly twice as big as RDFs’ average impact in the sample period.
Also, the impact of withdrawal during an election year is nearly similar in size to the
impact during recessionary periods. This finding suggests that there is substantial
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impact on state outputs for withdrawals from RDF during election years compared
to non-election years.
Table 3.9: Multipliers of Rainy Day Fund: Election Years
(1)
Changes in RDF -0.811∗
(0.418)
Changes in GFS -1.484
(1.832)
Changes in RDF in election years -3.336∗∗
(1.473)
Changes in GFS in election years 0.854
(2.366)
N 804
Note: The table reports output multipliers for a $1 increase in
RDF in election years. The regression employs the Arellano-Bond
estimator. The dependent variable is the one period ahead of change
in states’ real per-capita GDP. To save space, the coefficients for the
time-fixed effects and lagged variables are not shown in the table.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
3.5 Conclusion
Rainy day funds are potentially important mechanisms subnational governments
use to smooth expenditures during periods of fiscal stress. RDFs may have
differential impacts during different states of the economy. Fund accumulation
removes purchasing power from the economy during periods of economic expansion;
such removal may dampen growth. On the other hand, the disbursement of RDFs
may inject stimulus into the economy when funds are used during periods of fiscal
and economic stress. While these countercyclical influences on economic performance
are not the motivation for using RDFs, any effects may be important to the
states’ economic health and to overall fiscal and monetary policy coordination across
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branches of the fiscal hierarchy. Our results show that the fund has an impact on
output, which is slightly lower than estimates coming from directly observable changes
in government expenditure. Our evidence also points to a wider differential impact of
RDFs during periods of relatively high and low unemployment periods. Our results
show that the RDF has a bigger impact during recessionary periods. Also, RDF’s
impact during election years is as big as in recessionary periods.
Using unique data on RDFs and GFS for 43 U.S. states in 1987-2010, we find that
on average a deposit of one dollar in RDF would reduce output in the next period
by about $1.50. Such an impact on outputs is greater during recessionary periods
characterized by high unemployment. The RDF’s output multiplier is about 3.4 in
recessionary periods and is nil in expansionary periods. During election years, the
impact is as high as 3.4, similar to the impact in recessionary periods.
These findings have several important policy implications. First, while subnational
governments do not use RDFs to affect economic growth, our results suggest that they
may do so. Second, our results suggest the need for coordinating monetary and fiscal
policies across federal and state governments, especially as state RDF balances grow,
thus providing evidence that the states’ budget stabilization funds have implications
for economic growth.
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A.1 AR(1) Process
Table A.1: AR(1) Process of Productivity and Terms of Trade Shocks
(1) (2)
Total Factor Productivity Terms of Trade
ARMA
L.ar 0.533∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗
(0.0967) (0.136)
sigma
Constant 0.0149∗∗∗ 0.0296∗∗∗
(0.00177) (0.00294)
chi2 30.42 5.472
N 61 61
Note: This table shows the estimates of serial autocorrelation (persistency) for real
GDP (in terms of trillion dollars Canadian GDP) and the relative price of import to
exports, respectively. We use AR(1) process to estimate the coefficients using hp-filtered
smoothing parameter of 100 for both series. The standard deviation of the shocks for
each variable is shown as ‘sigma’. Standard errors are in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
100
A.2 Persistent Shocks
Table A.2: Variations Under the 1 s.d. Positive Productivity Shock
Variables No policy Cap Tax
Intensity
Target
Consumption 1.74 1.49 1.74 1.72
Labor 1.44 1.25 1.45 1.43
Investment 19.00 16.69 19.42 18.79
Output 3.62 3.13 3.64 3.60
Emission 3.61 0.00 3.64 3.60
Note: The table shows the coefficient of variations of key variables under the productivity shock of
1.5 times the standard deviation with 90% persistency. The coefficient of variation is the standard
deviation divided by the theoretical mean level (in percentage points).
Table A.3: Variations Under the 1 s.d. Negative Terms of Trade Shock
Variables No policy Cap Tax
Intensity
Target
Consumption 3.88 3.86 3.88 3.88
Labor 0.44 0.43 0.44 0.43
Investment 1.71 1.54 1.73 1.69
Output 0.26 0.22 0.26 0.26
Emission 0.26 0.00 0.26 0.26
Note: The table shows the coefficient of variations of key variables under the terms of trade shock of
1.5 times the standard deviation with 90% persistency. The coefficient of variation is the standard
deviation divided by the theoretical mean level (in percentage points).
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Table A.4: Welfare Differences Across Environmental Policy Instruments Under
Persistent Shocks
Change from No Policy % Change from No Policy
Description
No pol-
icy
Cap-and-
Trade
Tax
Intensity
Target
Cap-and-
Trade
Tax
Intensity
Target
Productivity Shock
Change in welfare -0.6089 -0.5740 -0.1972 -3.36% -3.17% -1.09%
Terms of Trade Shock
Change in welfare -0.5766 -0.5796 -0.1973 -3.11% -3.13% -1.07%
Note: The table shows the changes in welfare across environmental policy instruments from the
no policy case under the shocks of 1.5 times their corresponding standard deviations with 90%
persistency. In estimating the changes, total welfare is calculated as the sum of discounted welfare
keeping labor fixed from the steady state in the no policy case.
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Figure A.1: Impulse Responses Under the Productivity Shock (Panel A)
Note: The figures show the impulse responses of output, consumption, labor, capital, emissions,
and interest rate in response to the positive productivity shock of 1.5 times the standard deviation
with high (90%) persistency. The shock is shown on the bottom right corner panel in Figure A.2.
Zero on the vertical axis on each graph represents corresponding variable’s steady state level. The
responses are in terms of deviation from the steady state level.
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Figure A.2: Impulse Responses Under the Productivity Shock (Panel B)
Note: The figures show the impulse responses of debt, current account and trade balance in response
to the positive productivity shock of 1.5 times the standard deviation with high (90%) persistency.
The shock is shown on the bottom right corner panel. Zero on the vertical axis on each graph
represents corresponding variable’s steady state level. The responses are in terms of deviation from
the steady state level.
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Figure A.3: Impulse Responses Under the Terms of Trade Shock (Panel A)
Note: The figures show the impulse responses of output, consumption, labor, capital, emissions and
interest rate in response to the negative terms of trade shock of 1.5 times the standard deviation
with high(90%) persistency. The shock is employed through a positive shock to the relative price
of consumption as shown on the bottom right corner in Figure A.4. Zero on the vertical axis on
each graph represents corresponding variable’s steady state level. The responses are in terms of
deviation from the steady state level.
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Figure A.4: Impulse Responses Under the Terms of Trade Shock (Panel B)
Note: The figures show the impulse responses of debt, current account and trade balance in response
to the negative terms of trade shock of 1 standard deviation with high(90%) persistency. The shock
is employed through a positive shock to the relative price of consumption as shown on the bottom
right corner. Zero on the vertical axis on each graph represents corresponding variable’s steady
state level. The responses are in terms of percentage deviation from the steady state level.
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A.3 Highly Correlated Shocks
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Table A.5: Variations Under Highly Correlated Shocks
Variables No policy Cap Tax
Intensity
Target
ν = −0.045
Consumption 2.30 2.26 2.30 2.30
Labor 1.26 1.13 1.27 1.25
Investment 10.52 9.06 10.71 10.35
Output 2.21 1.93 2.22 2.20
Emission 2.21 0.00 2.22 2.20
ν = −0.45
Consumption 2.47 2.42 2.48 2.47
Labor 1.43 1.29 1.43 1.41
Investment 11.07 9.55 11.26 10.89
Output 2.31 2.01 2.31 2.30
Emission 2.31 0.00 2.31 2.30
ν = 0.045
Consumption 2.26 2.23 2.26 2.26
Labor 1.23 1.09 1.23 1.21
Investment 10.40 8.95 10.59 10.23
Output 2.19 1.91 2.20 2.18
Emission 2.19 0.00 2.20 2.18
ν = 0.45
Consumption 2.09 2.08 2.09 2.09
Labor 1.04 0.91 1.04 1.03
Investment 9.82 8.44 10.01 9.67
Output 2.09 1.82 2.10 2.09
Emission 2.09 0.00 2.10 2.09
Note: The table shows the coefficient of variations for 1 standard deviation terms of trade and total
factory productivity shocks under the selected correlations between the shocks. The coefficient of
variation is the standard deviation divided by the theoretical mean level (in percentage points).
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Appendix B
Emissions Leakage, Environmental
Policy and Trade Frictions
109
The reduced form solutions of hˆx, yˆ, xˆ, and eˆ in section 2.3 are
change in the manufacturing sector’s labor supply
hˆx = − θhy
θhx(1− α2) + θhy(1− α1)
ξ
1− ξ Tˆ ; (B.1)
change in the service sector’s outputs
yˆ = α2
θhx
θhx(1− α2) + θhy(1− α1)
ξ
1− ξ Tˆ ; (B.2)
change in the manufacturing goods sector’s outputs
xˆ = −α1 θhy
θhx(1− α2) + θhy(1− α1)
ξ
1− ξ Tˆ ; (B.3)
and change in emissions
eˆ = −
(
α1θhy
θhx(1− α2) + θhy(1− α1)
ξ
1− ξ +
1
1− ξ
)
Tˆ . (B.4)
110
Proof of Proposition 1:
Income effect on consumption
From Eq. (2.22)
Income effect =
α2Syθhx − α1Sxθhy
θhx(1− α2) + θhy(1− α1) (B.5)
Plugging α1 =
1
(1−ξ)
whx
eξx1−ξ and α2 =
why
p µ y
from the firm’s first order conditions
(where w is wage in an initial equilibrium) and plugging the shares Sx =
eξx1−ξ
C
,
Sy =
p µ y
C
, θhx =
hx
h¯
and θhy =
hy
h¯
, it yields:
Income effect =
1
C
whxhy
hx(1− α2) + hy(1− α1)
(
− ξ
1− ξ
)
(B.6)
which is negative.
Terms of trade effect on consumption
From Eq. (2.22)
Terms of trade effect = −Sx (B.7)
which is negative.
Since, cˆx = cˆy (Eq. (2.19)), increased emissions tax has negative effect both goods
and services’ consumption in a small open economy.
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Appendix C
Output Multipliers and State
Rainy Day Funds
112
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C.1 Rainy Day Fund Rules
Table C.1: RDF Rules for Deposit and Withdraw in 2002
State Deposit Rule Withdraw Rule
Alabama
20 percent from preceding fiscal year up to $75 million; appropriated
by Legislature
2/3 vote of the legislature
Alaska
Unexpended balance and by appropriations; oil and gas litiga-
tion/disputes settlements
Appropriation; 3/4 vote of Legislature
Arizona No limit
By formula with majority legislative appropriation; non-formula with
2/3 Legislature approval
Arkansas - -
California Appropriation by Legislature Appropriation by Legislature
Colorado Constitutional 4 percent of revenues Procedure has not been tried thus far
Connecticut 5 percent of net General Fund appropriations Fund deficit after the books have been closed
Delaware No greater than 5 percent of gross General Fund revenues
3/5 vote of Legislature for unanticipated deficit or revenue reduction
resulting from legislative action
Florida Appropriations Act
Governor declared emergency or legislative appropriations to cover
revenue shortfalls
Georgia 3 percent of prior year net revenue Revenue shortfall during recent year
Hawaii No limit. Receives 40 percent of tobacco settlement 2/3 vote of Legislature
Idaho
If General Fund grew more than 4 percent in the previous Fiscal Year
1 percent is transferred to the Budget Stabilization Fund. Capped
at 5 percent of the General Fund.
Legislative action
Illinois $225,000,000 (no limit) Comptroller can direct transfers to General Fund
Indiana Capped at 7 percent of state revenue Statutory formula
Iowa 5 percent of net General Fund Revenue
Simple majority of General Assembly for 40 percent of the fund. 3/5’s
majority of General Assembly for 60 percent of the fund; Simply
majority of General Assembly
Continued on next page
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Table C.1 – continued from previous page
State Deposit Rule Withdraw Rule
Kansas - -
Kentucky Goal of 5 percent of General Fund Budget Budget Reduction Plan- statute
Louisiana Revenues exceeding 750 million from minerals rents 1/3 of fund with legislative approval
Maine 6 percent of General Fund in immediately preceding Fiscal Year Legislation
Maryland 5 percent of estimated General Fund revenues for that fiscal year Act of the General Assembly or authorized specifically in Budget Bill
Massachusetts - Appropriation
Michigan Capped at 10 percent of General Fund year end balance Statutory formula
Minnesota Set in Statute at $622 million
Approval from the Governor and after consulting Legislative
Advisory Commission
Mississippi 7.5 percent of the General Fund by appropriation Appropriation
Missouri
Minimum 7.5 but can increase up to 10 percent of net general revenue
by legislative approval
Legislative disapproval
Montana - -
Nebraska Statute Statute
Nevada By comptroller, 10 percent of the General Fund Statute
New Hampshire 5 percent by statute Statute
New Jersey
50 percent of amount by which actual revenues exceeds anticipated
revenues; Capped at 5 percent of anticipated revenues.
Legislative approval
New Mexico - Legislative approval
New York State finance law Can be used when a deficit is incurred for temporary loans
North Carolina
1/4 of Credit Balance, capped at 5 percent of the appropriated
amount in the preceding year for the General Fund Operating
Budget.
Legislative approval
North Dakota Any amount over $40 million at the end of biennium. Actual revenues must be 2.5 percent below forecast
Ohio
By statute the stated intent is to have amount approximately 5
percent of the General Revenue fund for the preceding fiscal year
Legislative action necessary
Continued on next page
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Table C.1 – continued from previous page
State Deposit Rule Withdraw Rule
Oklahoma Maximum of 10 percent of preceding year’s general revenue
Up to half if revenue certification is below previous year, half can be
used upon declaration of the Governor and 2/3’s vote of Legislature,
or by legislative declaration of emergency and 3/4’s legislative vote.
Oregon - -
Pennsylvania Goal of 6 percent of General Fund revenue estimates. 2/3 legislative vote with the Governor’s request
Rhode Island 3 percent of resources Used to cover deficit caused by general revenue shortfall
South Carolina 2-3 percent of General Fund Revenue of last Fiscal Year Use when year-end deficit is projected
South Dakota 5 percent of General Fund in prior year’s General Appropriation Act Legislative appropriation
Tennessee By appropriation Revenue Shortfall
Texas
Capped at 10 percent of general revenue fund deposits during the
preceding biennium
3/5 vote of each house of Legislature to remedy deficits after budget
adoption. Other appropriations from this fund require a 2/3’s vote.
Utah - -
Vermont
Capped at 10 percent of average annual tax revenues on income and
retail sales for the 3 years immediately preceding.
Legislative appropriation
Washington
State general fund revenues in excess of expenditure limit by
Treasurer
Legislative appropriation
West Virginia Capped at 5 percent of the General Fund Appropriation Legislative appropriation
Wisconsin 50 percent of unanticipated revenues Legislative appropriation
Wyoming Appropriation of unexpected appropriated balance Legislative appropriation
Source: Budget Processes in the States. National Association of State Budget Officers. January 2002
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Table C.2: RDF Rules for Deposit and Withdraw in 2008
State Deposit Rule Withdraw Rule
Alabama
20 percent from preceding fiscal year up to $75 million; appropriated
by Legislature
2/3 vote of the legislature
Alaska
Unexpended balance and by appropriations; oil and gas litiga-
tion/disputes settlements
Appropriation; 3/4 vote of Legislature
Arizona 7 percent of Current year General Fund; No limit
By formula with majority legislative appropriation; non-formula with
2/3 Legislature approval
Arkansas Statutory Appropriation
California Appropriation by Legislature Appropriation by Legislature
Colorado Constitutional 4 percent of revenues Constitutional Act
Connecticut 10 percent of General Fund appropriations Fund deficit after the books have been closed
Delaware No greater than 5 percent of gross General Fund revenues
3/5 vote of Legislature for unanticipated deficit or revenue reduction
resulting from legislative action
Florida
5 percent of the last completed fiscal year’s net revenue
collection for the General Revenue Fund; Not exceeding 10
percent of the last completed fiscal year’s net revenue
Governor declared emergency or legislative appropriations to cover
revenue shortfalls
Georgia 10 percent of prior year net revenue Revenue shortfall during recent year
Hawaii No limit. 24.5 percent of tobacco settlement 2/3 vote of Legislature
Idaho
If General Fund grew more than 4 percent in the previous Fiscal Year
1 percent is transferred to the Budget Stabilization Fund. Capped
at 5 percent of the General Fund.
Legislative action
Illinois - Comptroller can direct transfers to General Fund
Indiana Capped at 7 percent of state revenue Statutory formula
Iowa 7.5 percent of net General Fund Revenue
Simple majority of General Assembly for 40 percent of the fund. 3/5’s
majority of General Assembly for 60 percent of the fund; Simply
majority of General Assembly
Kansas - -
Continued on next page
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Table C.2 – continued from previous page
State Deposit Rule Withdraw Rule
Kentucky Goal of 5 percent of General Fund Budget Budget Reduction Plan- statute, and Appropriations Act authority
Louisiana
Revenues exceeding 850 million from minerals rents, 25
percent of nonrecurring revenue which includes General
Fund Balance, capped at 4 percent of state revenue, less
federal disaster assistance
1/3 of fund with legislative approval
Maine
Capped at 12 percent of General Fund revenue in the
immediately preceding Fiscal Year, may not be reduced 1
percent of total General Fund revenue in the immediately
preceding state fiscal year
Legislation
Maryland 5 percent of estimated General Fund revenues for that fiscal year Act of the General Assembly or authorized specifically in Budget Bill
Massachusetts Statutory 15 percent of budgeted revenues Appropriation
Michigan Capped at 10 percent of General Fund year end balance Statutory formula
Minnesota Set in Statute at $622 million
Approval from the Governor and after consulting Legislative
Advisory Commission
Mississippi 7.5 percent of the General Fund by appropriation Appropriation
Missouri
Minimum 7.5 but can increase up to 10 percent of net general revenue
by legislative approval
Legislative approval by 2/3 vote
Montana - -
Nebraska Statute Statute
Nevada
40 percent of unrestricted fund balance that remains after
subtracting 10 percent of ongoing appropriations. Capped
at 15 percent of General Fund Operating appropriations
Statute
New Hampshire 5 percent by statute Statute
New Jersey
50 percent of amount by which actual revenues exceeds anticipated
revenues; Capped at 5 percent of anticipated revenues.
Legislative approval
New Mexico
The combination of balances is 10 percent of current year
recurring appropriations
Legislative approval
Continued on next page
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Table C.2 – continued from previous page
State Deposit Rule Withdraw Rule
New York 2-3 percent of General Fund spending Can be used when a deficit is incurred for temporary loans
North Carolina
1/4 of Credit Balance, capped at 8 percent of the appropriated
amount in the preceding year for the General Fund
Operating Budget.
Legislative approval
North Dakota
$200 million for the 2007-09 biennium and a maximum of
10 percent of general fund after July 1, 2009.
Actual revenues must be 2.5 percent below forecast
Ohio
By statute the stated intent is to have amount approximately 5
percent of the General Revenue fund for the preceding fiscal year
Legislative action necessary
Oklahoma Maximum of 10 percent of preceding year’s general revenue
Up to half if revenue certification is below previous year, half can be
used upon declaration of the Governor and 2/3’s vote of Legislature,
or by legislative declaration of emergency and 3/4’s legislative vote.
Oregon Cap of 7.5 percent of General Fund revenue in previous biennium
3/5 vote of legislature if certain revenue or economic conditions are
met. Can spend up to 2/3 of balance in a biennium.
Pennsylvania
25 percent of General Fund fiscal year ending surplus. If the
fund’s ending balance would equal or exceed 6 percent of
actual General Fund revenues for the fiscal year in which the
surplus occurs, the General Fund transfer would be reduced
to 10 percent.
2/3 legislative vote with the Governor’s request
Rhode Island 5 percent of resources by 2013 Used to cover deficit caused by general revenue shortfall
South Carolina 2-3 percent of General Fund Revenue of last Fiscal Year Use when year-end deficit is projected
South Dakota 5 percent of General Fund in prior year’s General Appropriation Act Legislative appropriation
Tennessee By appropriation Revenue Shortfall
Texas
Capped at 10 percent of general revenue fund deposits during the
preceding biennium
3/5 vote of each house of Legislature to remedy deficits after budget
adoption. Other appropriations from this fund require a 2/3’s vote.
Utah No cap -
Vermont Capped at 5 percent of prior year appropriations. Automatic when deficit occurs at year end
Continued on next page
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Table C.2 – continued from previous page
State Deposit Rule Withdraw Rule
Washington
State general fund revenues in excess of expenditure limit by
Treasurer, balance capped at 5 percent of general fund
revenues.
Legislative appropriation, 2/3 vote if resulting expenditures do
not exceed limit. Otherwise, a vote of the people is required.
West Virginia
50 percent of previous fiscal year general revenue surplus is
deposited in fund by code.
Legislative appropriation
Wisconsin 50 percent of unanticipated revenues Legislative appropriation
Wyoming No cap Legislative appropriation
Source: Budget Processes in the States. National Association of State Budget Officers. Summer 2008
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